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I.  ABSTRACT: 
Europe in the 16th Century was experiencing radical social, political and economic 
change.  Technological development was apparent in all aspects of society.  Most noteworthy 
was the invention of the printing press which enabled rapid dissemination of information to a 
rapidly increasingly literate general population.  Towns, the development of trades and the 
provision of specialized services were rapidly evolving.  European commerce was changing from 
a feudal structure to a money based economy.  That is, currency in return for goods and services 
was replacing a structure of peasants providing life essentials protected by aristocratic nobility.  
The centralized, complicated, hierarchical feudal political structure was rapidly becoming 
obsolete. 
Dynamic social, political and economic change is stressful.  Century old practices and 
paradigms were being replaced.  Europe may have made the change from feudalism to early-
modernity without bloodshed if the essentially important religious structures of Europe were 
stable.  The Catholic Church, however, was rife with corruption, absurd practices and greed 
facilitated by the organized confiscation of wealth in the form of tithes.  The Church had lost the 
confidence and earned the contempt of tens of thousands of the faithful it was presumably 
organized to serve.  On October 31, 1517, Martin Luther posted his Ninety-Five Theses, urging 
Church reform, on a German church door.  His views gained rapid acceptance.  In less than 40 
years, Lutheranism was the second well established and powerful religion in the Holy Roman 
Empire.  In less than 40 more years, Calvinism would become the third. 
The new Protestant religions eschewed the need for priests to act as intermediaries with 
God, the need for Church administered sacraments to gain redemption and – perhaps most 
importantly – the need to fund a centralized, corrupt and abusive Church structure.  This new, 
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revolutionary thinking easily extended to politics.  It called into question the antiquated, 
irrelevant, complicated and inefficient structures of the Holy Roman Empire. 
Historians disagree whether The Thirty Years War was a religious war extending to 
politics, or a political war extending to religion.  There is, however, no disagreement that religion 
was a powerful catalyst for dynamic stressful change that led to war.  This paper posits that there 
were seven principal causes for the outbreak of the Bohemian War, the first of a series of wars 
which became known as the Thirty Years War: 
• The Treaty of Augsburg; 
• The constant threat posed by the Ottoman Turks in the east and the Empire’s 
inadequate political structure to effectively deal with it;  
• The Hapsburg’s deliberately self-imposed weakening of Imperial authority and 
prestige;  
• The Brothers’ Quarrel;  
• The damaging, inconsistent and arbitrary application of Imperial policy and power;  
• The cumulative effect of 63 years of ever increasing political and confessionally 
charged tensions and conflicts that culminated in two warring camps – one led by 
Catholic Ferdinand II and the other led by Frederick V; and  
• The Bohemian Revolt itself. 
In 1620, The Bohemian War ended with the crushing defeat of the Rebels by Imperial 
forces at White Mountain, Bohemia.  Emperor Ferdinand II could have then ended the war, but 
chose to widen it into Germany in order to press his newly won military advantage and to press 
his Catholic and Imperial agendas.  A series of subsequent wars ensued that ultimately involved 
almost all of Europe.  The War ended with the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia and the codification of 
early-modern political structures. 
II. SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND:  
The name Thirty Years War is a misnomer.  The War was a series of armed conflicts or 
wars, between varying combatants internal and external to Germany.1  From the outbreak of 
hostilities in 1618, to their end with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the War, directly or 
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indirectly, involved every state-like political structure in Europe with the exception of Russia.  
Historian Peter Wilson chronicles the Thirty Years War as four successive and related conflicts:  
1) Commencing in 1618, the Bohemian War against the Catholic Hapsburgs; 2) The Palatine 
War for the years after the Bohemian’s defeat and the War's movement to western and southern 
Germany; 3) Spain's active participation in the War after the expiration of the Dutch/Spanish 12 
years truce in 1621, and 4) the Danish (1625-29), Swedish (1630-34) and French (1635-48) 
phases inclusively .2  This paper addresses issues that caused the war solely within the context of 
the political, religious and economic structures and events in 16th and early 17th Century 
Germany and Eastern Europe, and the Holy Roman Empire up to the outbreak of the 1618 
Bohemian Revolt.  
For the reader unfamiliar with European history of this period, and the War’s history, it is 
important to understand the rapid social, political and economic change taking place at this time.  
Dynamic change provided an environment that enabled the eventual outbreak of war.  
Heretofore, land and power were governed by landed aristocracy.  Europe was evolving into a 
money economy replacing the land economy.  A money economy provides diversified goods and 
services in return for a commonly accepted medium of exchange.  Political authority still resided 
in the hands of aristocratic lords, but without the resources to exercise their will.  The evolving 
merchant class had increasing capital, but no authority.  The feudal hierarchical system, with the 
peasants as vassals of the landlord – and the landlord responsible for the serfs' security – was 
becoming obsolete.  New duties were devolving to local authorities.  Slow transportation, bad 
communication and lack of resources required the centralized authorities of Church and State to 
delegate responsibility to local institutions – churches and nobles – essential to govern.  The 
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obsolete system was no longer justified by the underlying economics, which in turn weakened 
central authority and eroded its governing credibility.3 
At the core of the 16th Century Empire were millions of peasants and commoners living 
in 2,200 towns and 150,000 villages.  The population also dwelled in convents, monasteries and 
other communities across Europe.4  Churches were prominent fixtures in each settlement.  Small 
towns would have four or more, each serving as community focal points.5  The ubiquity of these 
buildings was reflective not only of faith, but the economic muscle of organized religion.6 
Life spans were short and living conditions horrific.  Discomfort was ubiquitous with 
prevailing inadequate housing and sanitation.  Rotting bodies on gibbets were a common sight.  
One traveler recorded that on the road from Dresden to Prague he counted "above seven score 
gallowes (sic) and wheels, where thieves were hanged, some fresh and some half rotten, and the 
carcasses of murderers broken limb after limb on the wheels."7  
Today we view Europe as a small continent and Germany as a geographically small 
country.  This was not the view of a 16th Century European.  Crossing Germany and the Empire 
required days of travel that involved physical and societal obstacles.  Governments were ill-
organized and the diplomatic tempo was limited to the speed of horse traffic and the vagaries of 
weather.  The faulty transmission of news altered political judgments.  Armed conflicts generally 
brought about no general immediate upheaval because they were largely fought by small 
professional armies.  Bloodshed, rape, robbery, torture, famine and disease were all common 
even in times of peace.  Torture was commonplace in criminal trials and gruesome executions 
were performed before large public audiences.8  The squalid existence of the average European 
was salved by hope, and hope was provided primarily by the beliefs promulgated by the Catholic 
Church.  Karl Marx later described this organizationally provided hope as an opiate. 
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Historian Georges Pages tells his readers that during the 16th Century, and the start of the 
17th Century, Germany was not really a nation at all.  The inhabitants spoke different dialects 
with regional differences so strong that they still endure today.  Consequently, there was no 
consensus of German nationalism other than a general disdain for foreigners.  There were so 
many regional independent governing institutions that hardly anyone can remember them all.9  
Loyalties were regional, to an immediate lord and religious confession and not to any concept of 
a nation, although some sense of nationhood was growing.10  Germany in the 16th and 17th 
Centuries lacked the essential conditions necessary for national unity.  There were no real 
national institutions.  There was an Emperor – something like a king, and an assembly – 
something like a representative body, but both were inadequate to establish true nationhood.11 
The political structure of the 16th and 17th Century Holy Roman Empire that governed 
Europe and Germany has been described as a monstrosity.  The Empire was a slow moving, 
intricate, elaborate system of institutional weights and counterweights.12  It is questionable 
whether the Empire was a monarchy or a hybrid alliance of principalities.13  The immediate 
vassals of the Empire acted as almost independent sovereigns, and their vassals could only reach 
the Emperor through them.  A further structural weakness was that primogeniture was not an 
established practice in the Empire.  Consequently, authority became generationally diluted.  
Moreover, there were free cities, free villages, Church lands, abbeys, and price-bishoprics.  
There were free knights and counts who considered themselves independent.  Thus, a total 
population of 21 million was governed by more than two thousand separate authorities.14  This 
political quagmire served hierarchical feudalism but was inadequate to serve the emerging forces 
of modernism. 
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In the middle of the 15th Century, there was an effort to introduce a system of assemblies 
to avoid anarchy.  But these bodies provided for no individual representation.  Today’s concept 
of the individual, endowed with rights, did not exist in theory or practice.  The secular and 
ecclesiastical Princes, counts and cities were happy to control land they held under the Emperor, 
but were careful not to give him any real authority.  Consequently, indirect Imperial power was 
weak.15  By the mid 16th Century, the settlements of the Empire were governed and bound by a 
series of hierarchical, overlapping jurisdictions.16 
In the second half of the 16th Century, the Hapsburgs collectively were the greatest power 
in Europe.  The Austrian House owned Austria, the Tyrol, Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, most of 
Hungary, Silesia, Moravia, Lusatia, and Bohemia, west Burgundy, and parts of Alsace.  The 
Spanish House owned, or claimed, the Low Countries, the fiefs of Finale and Piombino, and the 
kingdom of Naples, Sicily and Sardinia.  The Spaniards were kings of Spain and Portugal and 
controlled Chile, Peru, Brazil and Mexico.  But the newly bifurcated Spanish Kingdom and 
Empire were spread thin.  The Hapsburgs, moreover, were zealous in absolutism and the primacy 
of the Catholic Church.17 
The Empire was symbolic of the medieval concept of a single Christendom.  But this 
concept was about to abruptly change.  The Emperor held the imperial title and this positioned 
him above all other European crowns.  Conceptually, the Empire was the direct continuation of 
ancient Rome and the last of the great monarchies prophesied in the Book of Daniel.  But the 
reality was that the Emperor, other than fiefs under his direct domain, ruled indirectly through an 
array of Princes and lords bound as vassals.  These were immediate (Reichsunmittelbar) and 
mediate lords subject to the Reichsunmittelbar.  Immediate lords possessed imperial fiefs 
(Reichslehen).  All of the Empire operated in this or some subset of this hierarchy.  Sometimes 
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authorities overlapped.18  The Church embodied ecclesiastical lords and they considered 
themselves as the Imperial Church (Reichskirche), with vast land holdings.   
All these lords had rights acquired by inheritance; there were 50-60,000 noble families in 
the Empire.  By 1521, power had coalesced into three layers.  The most senior were the seven 
Imperial Electors who held fiefs mandated by the Golden Bull of 1356.  They had the exclusive 
right to elect each Emperor.  Three were Catholic clergy, responsible for praying for the 
salvation of all the Empire's souls and consequently, they were the First Estate.  These were: the 
Archbishops of Mainz, Cologne and Trier.  The secular Estates were the King of Bohemia, an 
independent kingdom entitled to a vote, but not part of the Empire and the duchies of 
Brandenburg, Saxony and the strategically important Palatinate.19 
The Hapsburgs dominated the Imperial landscape, but importantly they did not own it, 
nor did they exclusively control it.  They had to negotiate with the Electors to gain acceptance.  
The Emperor had broad discretionary powers, many of which were left vaguely defined.  Many 
facets of government were, however, clearly defined and administered through an array of 
cumbersome and complicated systems.  Tax collection determined which territories could be 
represented in the Reichstag and be recognized as an Imperial Estate (Reichsstand).  The 
Reichskammergericht, more commonly referred to as the Reichstag, consisted of three layers or 
colleges: the Electors, the Princes and the Cities.  The Emperor proposed topics for debate.  Each 
college took a vote determined by a majority.  The colleges then conferred in pairs, Electors to 
Princes and Princes to Cities.  The concluding document was referred to the Emperor who could 
accept or reject it.  In 1495, the Reichstag agreed to terms for a Permanent Peace.  Disputes were 
to be submitted to the then new Supreme Court, the Reichskammergericht designed to mediate 
compromise.  The Emperor also could also avail himself of the Reichshofrat, a separate court 
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that dealt with Imperial prerogatives.  Since these were vague, the Reichshofrat offered a venue 
to ultimately resolve disputes not settled by the Reichstag.  Decisions of the Imperial courts were 
enforced by ten circles or Kreises.  They acted independently or in conjunction with other 
Kreises.  Each had its own independent diet or assembly and a great deal of autonomy.20  Fiscal 
and military organization was vested in the ten circles such that, theoretically in concert with 
each other, it was possible for one half of the Empire to be engaged in warfare without any 
responsibility to the Emperor.21  Taxation was primarily to finance wars; social use of taxes was 
non-existent.  This was the situation in the German part of the Empire.  The Emperor lacked 
direct access to resources and was dependent on his minions for revenues.22 
Most of the imperial fiefs were both Estates and Kreis Estates with representation in the 
Reichstag and their regional assemblies.  In this paper, Princes are defined as personages with 
Estate status and power.  All the Kreises, moreover, were tied together through inter-marriage.  
The Emperor, however, only had direct control over those vassals that lived in his own dynastic 
lands.  He had no direct rule over the vast majority of the Empire’s inhabitants which lived under 
territorial lords.  Hence, the concept of German Freedom evolved.  This was an aggregation of 
perceived rights and privileges.  The Empire was a corporate collective with each piece of the 
Empire mutually dependent on others.23  The Kreises (or Circles) of the Empire in the 16th and 
early 17th  Century were: Austria, Burgundy  (special in status and virtually exempt from 
Imperial jurisdiction), Electoral Principalities along the Rhine or, Franconia, Swabia, Upper 
Rhine, Lower Rhine and Westphalia, Upper Saxony and Lower Saxony.24 
The Holy Roman Emperors had little direct power over domains ruled by the Estates, but 
as Kings, like Princes, they ruled lands where they had direct dominion.  Until 1555, the 
Emperor was King of Spain and the New World, parts of Italy, Sicily and Sardinia, French 
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Compte and the Netherlands.  The Emperor’s vast foreign power made him powerful in 
Germany.  But his power base was not Protestant Germany (Exhibit I).  This became more of a 
problem for Ferdinand I, Charles V’s successor in Vienna.  In 1555, when Charles V abdicated 
he split the Empire.  His brother Ferdinand I ruled the Austrian House as a now territorially 
diluted Holy Roman Emperor, and nephew Philip II ruled the Spanish House as King of Spain.  
Consequently, Ferdinand I no longer enjoyed the benefit of his predecessors’ global power and 
influence.  Ferdinand I’s relationship with Philip II was indeed a close one, and the Spanish King 
could and did help Ferdinand I, but he was not Ferdinand I’s to command as a vassal.  Philip II 
was also fully occupied with his own problems relating to the revolt in the Netherlands.25   The 
conflict between the minority German Protestant Princes (and a vast German Protestant majority 
population) and the majority Catholic Princes backed by a Catholic Emperor of foreign stock, 
made civil unrest a natural result.26   
Europe in the 16th Century was steadily, progressively changing from a dysfunctional, 
obsolete feudal structure to an early modern, money based society.  The dynamic pace of the 
social, political and economic development was also strongly affected by confessional or 
religious changes occurring in the Empire.  This catalyst for accelerated change commenced on 
October 31, 1517, with Martin Luther’s public posting of his Ninety-Five Theses.  This event 
marked the start of what would become the Protestant Revolution.  Just as it is important to 
understand the social political and economic changes occurring in 16th Century Europe, it is 
essential to understand the changes in the religious structures in Europe.  These structures 
provided the promise of eventual relief from temporal misery.  The profound changes brought 
about by the Protestant Reformation would have a profound destabilizing effect on Europe and 
Germany. 
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III. CONFESSIONAL BACKGROUND:   
The subsequent rise of conflicting religious confessions impaired the functioning of the 
Imperial government, and contributed significantly to the eventual breakout of war in 1618.  In 
1517, there was one Catholic religion.  Luther’s teaching prompted the establishment of a second 
Lutheran confession which took root in the first half of the 16th Century.  Calvinism, based on 
the teachings of John Calvin, emerged in the second half of the 16th Century as the Empire’s 
third religion.   By 1618, all three confessions were solidly established, politically powerful and 
conflicting ideologies.  Catholics represented centralized authority personified by the Pope and 
the Emperor.  Lutherans stressed the primacy of doctrine – the Bible being the one true source of 
religious interpretation.  The Calvinists, who believed that they represented the further evolution 
of concepts embraced by the Lutherans, represented the primacy of individual religious 
practice.27  
In today’s secular environment, it is difficult for most to understand the powerful and 
driving importance of the promise of a metaphysical after-life in the lives of 16th Century 
Europeans.  Religion was arguably more important than any social, political or economic 
influence.  The parties to the Thirty Years War may have used confessional changes and tensions 
to their benefit, but they were deep believers.  Modern secular hypocrisy, as it pertains to 
organized religion, is not evident in the historical accounts of the period.  Religion was a 
critically important part of life.   
Historian C. V. Wedgwood, in her article "The Futile and Meaningless War," contends 
that the German generation preceding the War was more devout than its successors.  Spiritual 
revival penetrated to the roots of society and was a reality to a population to whom politics was 
meaningless.  Theological readings and debates were ubiquitous.  For Catholics, the Cult of the 
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Saints reached epic proportions among the peasants and the educated alike.   Belief in the 
miraculous provided hope to a population experiencing extreme hardship, the breakdown of 
traditions and the erosion of the effectiveness of institutions.  Practice of the occult flourished.  
Rosicrucianism, the belief in a secret, hidden complete scientific explanation of everything, 
gained traction in Germany and France.  Devil worship and Black Magic were practiced 
throughout Europe.  The general populace was miserable and anxious, and all sorts of gruesome 
fears were inflamed by the publication of pamphlets that reported, exploited and magnified any 
strange event.28  Astrology was commonplace and was professionally practiced by no less than 
the famous astronomer Johannes Kepler.29 
The newly invented printing press allowed Luther’s Ninety-Five Theses wide distribution 
throughout Germany and set Europe ablaze with theological controversy.30  Luther initially set 
out to reform the Church, not replace it.  He published the Bible in German as the source of all 
truth, and his teaching removed the need for a priest as intermediary between the faithful and 
God.   
In 1520, Luther published Sermon on Good Works.  In it, Luther contended that salvation 
was gained by faith alone and debunked the Catholic belief that the power to forgive sins resided 
in the sacraments administered by the Church.  In To the Christian Nobility of the German 
Nation Respecting the Reformation of the Christian Estate, he called on Princes to correct abuses 
in the church, strip bishops and abbots of their wealth and create a de facto German Church.  He 
further called for the destruction of what he described as the three false walls erected by the 
Church that caused suffering among the faithful: 1) Popes, priests, bishops, monks in superior 
position to the laity and the exemption of clergy from the jurisdiction of civil authority; 2) the 
Papal claim to have the exclusive right to interpret the Scriptures; and 3) the use of Imperial 
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authority to summon councils to reinforce their ecclesiastical authority.31  Luther attacked the 
papacy for depriving the individual Christian of his freedom to approach God directly by faith.  
Priests were not necessary and four of the seven sacraments were superfluous.32 
In December 1520, the Pope excommunicated Luther and turned him over to Fredrick the 
Wise, Elector of Saxony, for execution.  Fredrick protected Luther instead.  Young Emperor 
Charles V was now faced with overriding Fredrick the Wise and facing the wrath of a quickly 
growing Protestant movement.  On May 21, 1521, The Diet of Worms gave Luther 21 days to 
recant or face Imperial Banishment.  Luther responded by founding the Lutheran Church laying 
the foundation, backed by powerful German Princes, that would soon lead to violence.33 
Subsequent to the Diet of Worms, Germany witnessed 23 years of intermittent warfare as 
the confessional parties sought to consolidate power.  The 1526 Diet of Speirer decided that no 
one should be punished for past offenses against the Diet of Worms and that each state should 
live, rule and comport itself as though it could answer to God and the Emperor.  The Protestants 
interpreted this as the sanctioning of the establishment of Lutheran Churches.  The Catholics 
continued to reject these assumptions.34 
In February 1529, Charles V ordered a reconvening of the Diet of Speirer.  It rescinded 
its Recess Order and passed a decree permitting Lutheran services in Lutheran Principalities but 
requiring the toleration of Catholic services in Lutheran states.  It forbade Lutheran preaching in 
Catholic states.  At the same time, the religious and political situation in Germany was a mess.  
The Diet of Speirer forbade the further progress of Protestantism; the Protestants were divided 
amongst themselves.  The whole Empire was menaced by the Turks under Suleiman, which was 
at the peak of its power.  At the same time, the Diet of Augsburg convened, at which the 
Protestants put forth their beliefs in writing and how it differed from Catholic doctrine.  This 
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document became known as the Augsburg Confession, regarded as the official Lutheran 
religious position.35 
The Protestant Revolution gave birth to the tenets of political Revolution in Germany: 1) 
the Bible was the basis of Faith which is personal; 2) it was necessary to break the clerical and 
academic monopoly of the priesthood by use of the vernacular; 3) salvation was a gift from God 
received by faith alone, not the Church; 4) and there was no functional distinction between laity 
and clergy.  These ideas easily translated to civil society and brought to question the need for the 
central authority of the Church and the Empire.36  Changes and challenges to the traditional, long 
established confessional dogma, combined with social, political and economic change, resulted 
in an unstable environment conducive to a violent but stabilizing solution. 
The Princes chose to back Luther for his doctrinal teachings because of its doctrinal 
appeal.   His teachings also served the Princes’ political and economic purposes, and rendered 
obsolete the onerous and ceaseless necessity to fund the Vatican.  Also, a reasonable deduction 
from Luther’s teachings was absolute regional sovereignty and the Princes’ right to appoint 
church officials within their own realms.  Luther's doctrine provided the basis for political 
independence from the Catholic Church.  The abuses of the Catholic Church, its absurd 
doctrines, its incessant financial demands coupled with Lutheranism’s implied independent 
thinking, made the new religion very attractive to the German Princes.37  Many of the Princes 
desired control over their own churches and dominion over church lands.  This was a direct 
challenge to central monarchal and ecclesiastic authority.38  Ultimately, what the Protestant 
Princes were not able to achieve through negotiation they were prepared to take by force.   
Also in 1529, the Reichstag took further measures to check perceived heresy.  In 1530, 
this action prompted the publication of the above mentioned Augsburg Confession which defined 
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Lutheran beliefs.  The resulting softening of the role of the priest and Church continued to have 
profound implications as a challenge to the centralized control of the Church and by political 
extension, to the Empire.  With the devolution of control to converted Lutheran Princes, there 
was also a change in control of Church-owned properties that lay in the converted Princes’ 
jurisdictions.  This control change became known as Secularization.  Secularization would 
become perhaps the most contentious issue that would eventually lead to war.  
Threats of prosecution by the Reichstag prompted the Elector of Saxony, the Landgrave 
of Hessen and other Lutheran Princes to form the Schalkaldic League in 1531.  This was also a 
very significant event in our narrative leading toward war because it set the precedent for the 
later formation of armed defensive associations outside the scope of the Imperial Constitution.39  
Like today’s British Constitution, the Imperial version was an unwritten, but well known and 
accepted understanding of the rights and responsibilities of the ruling elites of the Empire. 
Luther's teaching was embraced partly because it freed local power from interference by 
the Pope.  It flourished because European kings protected it and merchants facilitated it.  The 
result was the erosion of the unity of Catholic Christendom.  The polarization of Europe was 
further facilitated by Calvin in 1536, with his publication of Christianae Religionis Institutio and 
Ignatius Loyola in 1534, with the founding of the Jesuits.  Calvin argued that the fate of each 
soul, salvation or damnation was predetermined by God.  This was not just theology; it was 
radical new political theory.  Priests were not necessary in this new paradigm.  Hierarchy was 
replaced by the individual in relationship to his community and vice versa.  This was a rival 
political formation to Imperial Rule.40  We shall see that the establishment of zealous Calvinism 
and the formation of the equally zealous Society of Jesus gave root to powerful antagonistic 
political and confessional forces.   
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Catholics contended that the Protestants were intransigent and unwilling to reconcile all 
their differences, which prompted Emperor Charles V to order the Protestants to submit to Papal 
authority.  Subsequent conferences between Protestants and Catholics in 1540 and 1541 failed to 
bring peace.   The Emperor then took steps to eliminate Protestantism and restore Imperial 
obedience.  In the ensuing war in 1547, the Schalkaldic League was soundly defeated but the 
Lutheran religion was still spreading rapidly throughout Germany.  In 1552, war broke out again 
and the Protestants, aided by France, defeated Emperor Charles V.  In 1555, Charles V convened 
the parties which resulted in the Peace of Augsburg.  The real winners of the Peace would be the 
German Princes.  But the Peace of Augsburg arguably would work reasonably well until the 
early 17th Century when religious alliances became more political and polarized.41 
The Church was rife with corruption and practices that Luther contended did not have a 
basis in scripture; his views continued to spread rapidly.  The Council of Trent, convened by the 
Pope in 1545-63, was intended to put forth political and theological Church reforms.  It was also 
intended to provide counter-measures to the wave of Protestantism sweeping the Empire.  The 
Council’s final decrees redefined Catholicism and supplied a program to eliminate heresy by a 
renewal of Catholic Life.  They provided the basis for what would become known as the 
Counter-Reformation.  Moreover, Spain’s concurrent victory over France gave Spain control of 
the Italian lands surrounding the Papal States thereby strengthening the bonds between the 
Church and the Hapsburgs.42 
In 1546, Martin Luther's death created a crisis for Lutherans which would fracture the 
new religion and facilitate the birth of Calvinism.  Now, within the span of thirty years, instead 
of One True Church, there would be three.  Lutheran pragmatists followed his disciple Philipp 
Melanchthon, who represented the Erasmus humanist strand of Lutheranism.  Opponents styled 
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themselves Gnesio Lutherans or the Real Thing.  The defeat of the Schalkaldic League at the 
Battle of Muhlberg resulted in an Interim Treaty pending papal approval.  The Gnesio regarded 
the Interim as the first step toward their eradication and rejected the more moderate Philippist 
hope of reconciliation within the Church.  They would become associated with the works of John 
Calvin.  The growth of Calvinism in the Empire was driven by the conversion of Princes, not the 
general population.  In 1560, the conversion of the Elector of the Palatine gave Calvinism real 
momentum.43 
Metaphysical beliefs had a profound influence in 16th and early 17th Century Europe.  The 
erosion of the Catholic Church’s ecclesiastic standing provided fertile ground for Luther’s and 
Calvin’s revolutionary teachings.  Religious beliefs are deeply emotionally seated.  The 
Protestant Reformation introduced religious passion to an already dynamically changing social, 
economic and political environment.  The Reformation, and the Catholic Counter-Reformation, 
accelerated change in the Empire and contributed strongly to the eventual outbreak of the Thirty 
Years War. 
IV. HISTORIANS’ ATTRIBUTIONS OF THE VARIOUS CAUSES OF THE THIRTY 
YEARS WAR:   
 
 The history of events and circumstances surrounding the Thirty Years War has been a 
subject of intense scrutiny by historians up to the present day.  Over time, historians have 
traditionally viewed The Thirty Years War as a religious conflict that degenerated into a political 
one or a political conflict disguised as a religious conflict.44 
Jesuit Robert Bireley believes that the ambiguities of the Peace of Augsburg led to the 
Thirty Years War.  In the 1580's, a generation after the Peace, conflicting interpretations 
provoked prolonged litigation, political conflict and finally, violence.  In 1559, the Palatinate 
became Calvinist.  In 1583, the Archbishop Elector of Cologne announced he was converting to 
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Protestantism and intended to take his bishopric with him.  Duke William of Bavaria militarily 
intervened to keep the Electoral majority Catholic.  The militant Protestant majority refused to 
accept the authority of the Reichstag and the Reichshofrat which resulted in political paralysis.   
In 1607, the Imperial City of Donauwörth became a contentious issue.  Minority Catholics 
revived processions that were disrupted by the majority Protestants.  The Reichshofrat placed the 
city under Imperial Ban and sent Maximilian of Bavaria to occupy it.  He eventually 
incorporated it into Catholic Bavaria.45 
S. H. Steinberg tells his readers that the popular concept of the Thirty Years War as 
solely a religious war is simplistic.  Religious schism coincided with political, constitutional and 
economic issues.46  He adds that the reason for the numerous conflicts that comprised the Thirty 
Years War were constitutional issues that festered for over fifty years.  On one hand, the 
Hapsburg Emperors undertook efforts to transform a loose confederation of hundreds of 
principalities and free cities into a homogeneous unit under Imperial authority.  On the other 
hand, most of the Princes, the Emperors included, attempted to establish absolute monarchical 
authority within the principalities they ruled. 47 
Theodore Rabb disagrees somewhat and tells his readers that it is customary to see the 
War as the last of the religious wars and its causes as the Reformation and Counter-
Reformation.  As the War progressed, political, dynastic and other motives came into play.  
Nonetheless, the fundamental issue that caused the War was religion.48   
Samuel Rawson Gardiner believed that the dispute over the Augsburg Treaty concerning 
the status of Protestant Administrators, not Bishops and Secularized lands, was the principal 
cause of the Thirty Years War.  Gardiner, moreover, believed that the lack of any governing 
institutions to reflect the thinking of the general population eliminated any possibility for 
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compromise.  There was, he contends, no trace of any mutual hostility between Catholic and 
Protestant districts apart from their rulers.49 
Franz Mehring, in his article “The Marxist View: Economic Causation,” agreed that the 
Spiritual Restriction in the Treaty of Augsburg was a problem causing deep resentment for 
Protestants.  Every spiritual Prince, Elector, Arch-Bishop, Bishop or Abbot who deserted 
Catholicism would be deprived of office.  The Lutherans objected because it deprived them of 
the most convenient way to acquire Church property.50   
Georges Pages tells his readers that the Peace of Augsburg did not resolve the religious 
conflict it was tasked with.  Instead, it marked the beginning of a cold-war which finally ignited 
in 1618.   
C. V. Wedgwood contends that in the first years of the Reformation the weakness of 
Catholic Princes forced them to make concessions to their Lutheran subjects.  This created a 
sense of danger in Catholics; any imposition of an infringement of Protestant liberties caused 
deep resentment with Protestants.  In Germany, Catholics continued to be a ruling minority 
linked inexorably to the Austrian House of Hapsburg.51  Wedgewood asserts that the Thirty 
Years War was the last major religious conflict in Europe.   
George Grayling has his own thoughts.  He contends that the war originated, as is all too 
often with wars, with a peace treaty.  In this case, it was the Peace of Augsburg.52   He adds that 
that the war was not primarily' religious.  Grayling, however, concedes that there can be no 
dispute, that the Reformation and Counter-Reformation profoundly influenced events that led to 
the War.53   
Distinguished historian Peter Wilson disagrees:  
As you will have gathered from my book, I believe the 1555 peace was 
remarkably successful and that the Empire did have the capacity to defuse 
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tensions – certainly more effectively than in the contemporary Netherlands or 
France. However, a vacuum opened up after 1600 due to the Habsburgs’ own 
problems and this created space for rival parties led by the two branches of the 
Wittelsbachs. 54  
 
Wilson adds that conflict was not inevitable.  In 1618-20 there was no desire for a major 
war.  After the start of hostilities, all the parties continued to negotiate for peace up to the end of 
the War in 1648. 
Ronald G. Asch, in The Thirty Years War: The Holy Roman Empire and Europe 1618-
1648, argues that tension over religious beliefs and their political affiliations were the primary 
cause in igniting The Thirty Years War.55   
All these eminent historians are correct depending on how The Thirty Years War is 
viewed.  In any context, the antiquated, wholly inadequate political institutions in 16th Century 
Germany and the Empire were insufficient to cope with the evolving powerful trends toward 
modernity.  Germany, however, might have struggled through inevitable changes without 
bloodshed.  But the Protestant Revolution, starting with Luther and stridently evolving with 
Calvinism, coupled with ardent Catholic orthodoxy of the Counter-Reformation, eventually 
rendered a peaceful outcome impossible.  This brings us to the causes of the War. 
V. STRUCTURAL INADEQUACIES, POORLY CRAFTED LEGISLATION, ERODING 
IMPERIAL AUTHORITY, ESCALATING CONFESSIONAL CONFLICT, AND THE 
EVENTUAL INTRACTABILITY OF TWO RULING PRINCES CAUSED THE THIRTY 
YEARS WAR: 
 
The outbreak of the Thirty Years was not the result of a new set of causal circumstances 
but the continuation of old unsettled conflicts.56  The War’s genesis was in the Empire’s outdated 
social, political and economic structures.  The religious Revolution, moreover, not only changed 
the form of worship and the conception of mortal destiny.  It fostered new notions of Princely 
independence, new attitudes concerning the use of the vernacular and changed attitudes toward 
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the living of life itself.  This provided the philosophical and theological justification for the 
formation of new political structures and the German Princes’ rationale for breaking with Roman 
Catholicism and increasing their own power.  The political landscape of Germany was 
permanently altered.57   With the rise of spiritual unrest in the early 16th Century, European 
Princes sought to control their own national churches and resented not having control over 
Church lands.  They became more challenging to Rome's authority.58 
The ensuing series of wars – The Thirty Years War – the first of which was the 1618 
Bohemian Revolt and its resulting crushing defeat by the Empire were due to a series of 
reinforcing, cascading, snowballing events.  The Treaty of Augsburg – the so-called Religious 
Peace – recognized Lutheranism as an official religion but ignored Calvinism.  Its terms on key 
issues were deliberately vague and subject to ongoing varying interpretations by the affected 
parties.  Resolution of differences was left to be adjudicated in the Imperial courts.  The Peace, 
nonetheless, held until 1618.  Germany would not experience war for 63 years – the longest 
period of uninterrupted peace in Germany until after WWII.  But 63 years, especially in terms of 
the harsh living conditions in the 16th Century, was a long time – perhaps three to four 
generations.  The terms of the Peace were inelastic and Confessional momentum favored the 
Protestants.  The vagaries and ambiguities of the Treaty eventually resulted in escalating, 
insolvable conflicts. 
The Imperial structure of the Empire minimized the power of the Emperor to unilaterally 
confront an ever present threat of the Islamic Ottomans on its Eastern border.  The political 
structure of the Empire required that the Princes finance the Imperial defense.  They, in turn, 
exacted ever increasing confessional and political concessions in return for their financial 
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support.  This progressively increased the power of the Protestant Princes and decreased the 
power of the Emperor. 
In 1564, subsequent to the death of Ferdinand I, the Hapsburgs were in disarray.  The 
political structure of the Empire arguably contributed to the Emperors’ funding their office with 
debt.  To repay their indebtedness, the Hapsburgs diluted the Emperor’s concentrated power and 
granted concession after concession to the Protestant Princes.  In 1576, after the death of 
Ferdinand I’s son, Maximilian II, the Hapsburgs became embroiled in an intense family struggle 
for power and Imperial succession which became known as The Brothers’ Quarrel.  This 
Hapsburg family battle largely revolved around events in the eastern part of the Empire.  The 
Brothers purchased improvements in their respective positions by significantly increasing their 
concessions to the Princes.  The Hapsburgs also squandered political capital with their heavy 
handed use of self-serving solutions to succeeding political crises in Germany.   
For decades, the Hapsburgs continuously diluted Imperial power historically vested in the 
Emperor.   The Hapsburg’s also were inconsistent in the application of Imperial policy.  The 
continuous policy of concessions emboldened the Protestant Princes; the arbitrary and capricious 
application of Imperial power enflamed them.  The centralized power of the Church and Empire 
was on a collision course with the ever increasingly decentralized power of the Protestant 
Estates.   
The avoidable drift toward the start of The Thirty Years War became unavoidable when 
new, young opposing political and confessional principals assumed power in the early 17th 
Century.  Staunch Calvinist Frederick V, the young Palatine Elector, usurped the Bohemian 
Crown from the equally zealous Catholic new Emperor Ferdinand II.  The slide toward war 
culminated with Ferdinand II’s crushing defeat of Frederick V.  Ferdinand II could have ended 
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hostilities at that point.  Instead he expanded The Bohemian war westward and southward into 
Germany.  It would eventually expand into a Pan-European conflict – The Thirty Years War.  
War would rage in Europe until the transformational Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.  The 
Westphalia Peace terms would transition Europe toward sovereign states and modernity. 
A.  The Peace of Augsburg and the Council of Trent: 
Historians differ as to the degree of the Treaty of Augsburg’s causal influence for the 
Thirty Years War.  Wilson, in particular, contends that the Treaty worked reasonably well until 
the political turmoil in the late 16th Century.  Supporters of the Treaty positively cite its 
longevity.  Several, however, cite the Peace as a primary reason for the War, and all 
acknowledge the Treaty’s importance.  The Treaty of Augsburg significantly influenced the 
events that led to the War. 
In 1555, at the direction of the Emperor Charles V, and soon to be Emperor Ferdinand I, 
an assembly of the affected parties convened in Augsburg with the purpose of reconciling 
religious differences.  This resulted in the Treaty of Augsburg, or The Religious Peace.  The 
1555 Treaty of Augsburg consisted of two parts: the religious peace and the executive 
regulation.  Both were unsatisfactory compromises.  Steinberg contends that the main weakness 
of the Treaty was the absence of any effective means for interpretation of its ambiguous clauses 
and effective enforcement mechanisms.59 
The Treaty of Augsburg intentionally did not define faith.  The Peace was intended to 
bring opposing confessions together through the same legal framework.  The framers of the 
Augsburg Peace deliberately blurred religious distinctions to maintain the old and perhaps 
obsolete universal concept of a single Christendom.60  Lutherans were defined as "adherents to 
the Confession of Augsburg" but the Treaty did not define what that meant.61   The Treaty 
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forbade the enforcement of heresy laws against Lutherans and obligated both confessions to 
arbitrate their differences though the Reichstag.  This provision put the religious settlement 
within the domain of the Imperial Peace of 1495.62  Recall that the Reichstag had then agreed to 
terms of a Permanent Peace. 
The deliberate vagaries of the Treaty of Augsburg became known as the Three Dubia or 
differing interpretations of three key terms: 
1. The fate of immediate ecclesiastical lands or the legal status of clerical Imperial 
Estates controlled by Lutherans after 1552.  Ferdinand I allowed the Lutheran Princes license to 
practice their religion, but these Princes were unwilling to cede ecclesiastical control of 
properties they controlled.  Ferdinand I skirted this major issue by pronouncing the occupying 
Princes as administrators, not clerics.  After 1582, this pronouncement would become a major 
problem when the number of Estates administered by Lutherans threatened the Catholic majority 
in the Reichstag.  The major continuing issue of the Treaty was the ownership of Church assets.   
Article 19 of the Peace fixed the Peace of Passau 1552 as the Normative Year, the benchmark for 
the determination of asset ownership.   Protestants could keep the lands Secularized by that date, 
and this was accepted as part of the General Peace.  But in order to appease Catholics,  
Ferdinand I unilaterally inserted Article 18, The Ecclesiastical Reservation, into the Treaty.63 
The Reservation provided that if Protestants acquired Church properties after 1552, they 
had administrative but no clerical rights.  The intent and effect of this provision was to guarantee 
Church dominance in Imperial institutions.  Lutherans continuously and assiduously argued that 
the Ecclesiastical Reservation was not part of the Peace because they never agreed to it.  
Consequently, they believed that a converted Protestant Cathedral Chapter could and should 
appoint a Protestant cleric as a bishop, with all attendant rights.64  The Ecclesiastical Reservation 
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was a primary cause of the War.  Its effects would be felt long after the Protestant defeat in the 
Bohemian Revolution.  Indeed, this clause would later be embraced and enforced by Emperor 
Ferdinand II and served to invite the intervention of foreign powers later in the War.  The 
Ecclesiastical Reservation was not only a cause of the War, it served to prolong it. 
2. The status of mediate ecclesiastical property within the jurisdiction of Lutherans 
after 1552.  Recall that immediate lords possessed Imperial fiefs (Reichslehen) and mediate lords 
did not, and they were subordinated to immediate lords.  Sometimes it was not clear whether 
properties were an Imperial Estate or mediate holdings. 
3. The status of territories wherein Catholic majorities outnumbered the Lutherans in 
which Catholics claimed the right to expel dissenters.  Lutherans believed that the exercise of 
religion was a voluntary freedom.  After the 1570s, this issue became a bigger problem when 
Catholic rulers made religion a litmus test for political loyalty.  The Treaty recognized the 
legality of the two confessions at the territorial level.  The Treaty of Augsburg also provided for 
what would later be termed cuius regio, eius religio, or he who rules a territory has the right to 
determine his subjects’ religion.  Recall that the concept of individual rights was non-existent.  
The right to reform the Church (ius reformandi), was deemed to be a prerogative of the Princes 
like any other religious right.  But it was not the framers’ intent to divide on this issue because 
they still had hope for religious reconciliation.  The treaty also provided for ius emigrandi, or the 
right to emigrate, to every person to a territory consistent with his or her religion.  This right in 
reality was illusory given the socio-economic structure prevailing in 16th Century Germany.  
Instead of unifying, the Treaty provided a vehicle for increased separation in the Empire.65  The 
Peace gave Lutherans legal equality but insured that Catholics would maintain a political 
majority.66  
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In addition to its structural vagueness, the Treaty only recognized the Lutheran religion as 
stated in the Confession of Augsburg 1530.  It did not recognize Calvinism.  In 1555, Calvin had 
only just begun to evangelize France.  After the Augsburg Peace, Catholic and Lutheran rulers 
were troubled as they watched Calvinism establish a foothold in Germany.67 
The Peace of 1555 was intended to freeze the position of the two churches that year.  But 
the Lutheran religion continued to grow and evolve, and the Catholic Church would soon mount 
an effective Counter-Reformation.  By extension the Ecclesiastical Reservation had a powerful 
effect.  If a Prince of the Church turned Protestant, he could not avail himself of cuius regio sius 
religio on his subjects and had to renounce his religious and property rights.  The second 
important point of dispute was whether free cities had the right of ius reformandi affirmed by 
Protestants and denied by Catholics.   
At the core of the differing interpretations were differing views of the Peace, similar to 
the current political positions in the United States concerning the interpretation of the American 
Constitution.  Catholics believed that the Treaty was to be interpreted by the clear letter (Klare 
Buchstabe) of the law and to check any further spread of Lutheranism.  Lutherans believed that 
1555 was the start of a continuing reformation effort, not the end.  Calvinists thought they should 
be included because they were evolved Lutherans.  Not so, said the Catholics and Lutherans.   
Many Lutherans had more problems with the Calvinists then they did with Catholics.  Calvinists 
were more likely to use extra-constitutional means of resistance.  This would later result in an 
escalation of tensions as Calvinism grew in acceptance.68  Moderate Catholics saw the Peace as a 
concession that left the Lutherans as a tolerated minority within a common legal framework.  
Militant Catholics believed in the rigid Jesuit interpretation: The Peace of 1555 merely 
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suspended the ban of Protestants in 1521.  The Peace would last only until the two parties could 
resolve their differences.69  Thus, the Treaty became a time bomb.   
There was nothing elastic about the legislation.  It did not adopt the majority religion as 
the religion of the land and it not adopt the principle of individual religious liberty.  Both sides of 
the aristocracy jealously protected their rights without regard to the social and economic 
evolution of Germany.70  As we have seen, Germany was dynamically changing.  The Treaty, 
moreover, was religiously narrow and made no provision for any Protestant belief other than 
Lutheran.  The commonality between the religions was that Princes determined the religion of 
their subjects.  This suited the Emperor but put many of the Catholic Princes in a contradictory 
position to their majority Lutheran subjects.71 
The Treaty created new problems.  Ecclesiastical Princes ruled vast territory along the 
Rhine, and Franconia and Northern Germany.  They also controlled about half of the second of 
the three councils of the Reichstag.    The Ecclesiastical Reservation provided that all 
Ecclesiastical properties acquired by the Protestants after the treaty would lose their political 
power.  The reservatum ecclesiasticum – the Religious Reservation – was intended to leave 
political power in the hands of Catholic regardless of the ever-increasing Lutheran religion in 
Germany.  Frederick Schiller, therefore, contends that the treaty was not a peace "but a truce 
between a sovereign and unconquered rebels."72  The Reservation would cause irreconcilable 
problems as the Protestants did not believe it to be valid or legal, and the Catholics considered it 
a binding part of the Religious Peace.73 
But the Peace of Augsburg was a milestone; for the first time, Lutheranism was 
acknowledged as a legal religion.  The real winners of the Augsburg Peace were the German 
Princes, for each became de facto head of his own church.  They were territorially superior to the 
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Emperor and ecclesiastically supreme in the Church.  Thus, the Treaty was politically divisive, 
contrary to a national unifying effect and antithetical to the centralized strength of the Emperor. 
This notwithstanding, the Peace of Augsburg arguably worked reasonably well for decades, but 
by the early 1600's, religious alliances became more and more political and the Treaty less 
tenable.74  The Peace gave Lutherans legal equality but left the Catholics with a political 
majority; Catholics controlled the legal system.75  The Protestants eventually could only defend 
their positions by paralyzing the constitution.  In 1601, they refused to acknowledge the decision 
of the Imperial tribunal.  In 1608, they walked out of the Reichstag which would not re-assemble 
until 1640, well after the outbreak of the War.76    
By 1618, Calvinism became a powerful component of Europe’s diverse confessional 
picture.77  Unanimity of Protestant belief may have prolonged the peace, but Calvinism 
prospered in Geneva and soon spread to Germany, serving to divide the Protestants among 
themselves.  The Reformation was evolving and the terms of the Augsburg Treaty arguably 
served the interests of those seeking to arrest its spread, not accommodate it.78  The continuing 
evolution of Protestantism and the opposing measures of the Catholics also served to keep the 
parties at odds with each other.  The interpretation of the Treaty would remain in constant 
dispute.79  Historian Ronald G. Ash points out that the Peace of Augsburg increased religious 
tensions.  Catholics and Protestants remained convinced that theirs was the true religion.  Both 
sides would appeal to the courts for resolution of local affairs.  But as years passed, the Empire's 
legal effectiveness eroded into paralysis.80   
To varying degrees, historians Robert Bireley, Samuel Gardiner, Franz Mehring and 
George Grayling contend that the weakness of the Treaty of Augsburg was a significant cause of 
the Thirty Years War.  Peter Wilson, who believes that the Treaty insured the peace and worked 
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reasonably well until the turn of the 17th Century, concedes the problems associated with the 
Treaty provided a cause for war after 1618.81   All the cited historians, however, acknowledge 
that the Treaty, to some degree, had a causal effect. 
In 1563, The Council of Trent established new dogma and condemned all Protestant 
innovations.82  Heretofore, the Catholic Church in Protestant domains was obsolete.  It was only 
with the establishment of the Jesuit Order in 1534 that an effective Counter-Reformation truly 
began.  The Jesuits were a zealous, spiritual, military-like order bound by unquestioning 
obedience to their superiors.  When the Council of Trent concluded, the Church now had the 
weapon to wage spiritual war.  Organizationally, the Jesuits were structured like an army – their 
goal was to eradicate Protestantism and restore the primacy of the Church.  The order was 
politically motivated; the Jesuits became confessors to many crowns in Europe and exercised 
profound political influence.  Jesuit Martin Becan was Emperor’s Ferdinand II confessor during 
the Thirty Years War.  The Order expanded rapidly from 1,000 at the time of its founder Ignatius 
Loyola's death in 1556 to 13,000 in 1615.  The Jesuits also spearheaded education.  By 1618, 
there were 22 Jesuit colleges in the Rhineland, 20 in south Germany and 23 in Austria and 
Bohemia.  They quickly became a powerful and polarizing religious force.83 
 The Calvinists, on the other hand, were the most militant of the Protestants.  They were 
not unified, but rather a heterogeneous mass of scattered communities with no central 
government.  Arguably an extension of a new Lutheran Confession, the Calvinists already had a 
Protestant Church structure.  They simply entrusted the structure with new tasks.  The Calvinists 
established a system of mutual monitoring in which parishioners and ministers reported on each 
other's doctrinal conformity and moral standards.  This decentralized structure was directly at 
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odds with the centralized authority of the Church and Empire.84  Protestants lacked cohesiveness 
due to disagreements over doctrine in addition to the other omnipresent political dynamics.   
Two distinct Protestant groups emerged.  Saxony led the more moderate Lutherans which 
favored working within the framework of the Religious Peace of 1555.  The more radical 
Calvinists, led by the Palatinate, sought constitutional change through confrontation.85  The 
Jesuits were organized, and although the Calvinists were not, they were radical and hated the 
Lutherans almost as much as they hated the Catholics.  These were powerful destabilizing 
forces.86   A common faith had alone given unity to a disintegrating Empire.  When Protestant 
ascendancy blunted institutions, and Princes sought to take advantage of it, the governing 
concepts of 500 years evaporated.   
The Treaty of Augsburg saved the theory of religious unity for each Estate but destroyed 
it for the Empire.  Lutherans and Catholics still hoped for reconciliation, but the rise of 
Calvinism within a decade after the Treaty destroyed that chance.87  The Calvinists, outside the 
sphere of the Peace, became the fighting protagonists of Protestantism.  The Jesuits dismissed 
Calvinism as wicked and contrary to their deepest beliefs.  They consequently considered it their 
sacred mission to destroy it.88  The implementation of the outcomes of the Council of Trent 
served to exacerbate political and confessional tensions that would eventually lead to war. 
B.  The Islamic Ottoman Turks and the Empire: 
The Imperial Constitution mandated that the Princes, not the Emperor, were responsible 
for funding the defense of the Empire.  The debilitating effect of this structural inadequacy was a 
cause of the Thirty Years War.   
In the late 16th Century, the power and prestige of the Emperor had eroded significantly.  
This was a result of the continuing Ottoman threat in the east, constitutional weakness of the 
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Emperor and strife over Imperial succession.  The Emperor did not have monarchial power.  
When elected, each emperor had to consent to concessions, or Wahlcapitulation.  This was a 
contract that guaranteed Electors' independence and their continued pre-eminence in Europe.  
Each Emperor, consequently, was individually dependent upon the Electors for his power.  He 
had to consult with the Electors on matters of war and peace, foreign policy, taxes, and 
alliances.89   The Emperor also depended on the Estates – both Protestant and Catholic – to 
provide almost sole financial support against the ever-threatening Turks.  The Protestant Estates 
exploited this dependence to extract continuous political and confessional concessions.90 
The Islamic Turks were an ever-present threat to the Empire.  In June 1593, the Austrians 
soundly defeated the Turks at the battle of Sissek.  The Turks subsequently declared war on the 
Empire, “The Long Turkish War,” which lasted until 1606.91  The Ottoman Sultan reluctantly 
agreed to the War as the Ottoman Turks had been involved in a series of lengthy and expensive 
conflicts for decades.  The Sultan consented only at the urging of his Grand Vizier to escalate to 
a general war.92  The Sultan’s concern was prescient.  The outbreak of war between the 
Ottomans and the Empire brought about significant political and economic change.  Initially, 
militancy on the Catholic and Protestant sides of the Imperial political spectrum was muted as 
the Moslem threat united all the Estates and the Empire.  However, the inability to make 
significant progress in the war eventually bred increasing discontent.   
The war indeed was costly. Worsening financial problems prevented the coordination of 
Imperial armies with some Walloon and French units defecting to the Turks.  The situation was 
equally difficult for the Ottomans, who faced revolts in five provinces.  In 1604, Sultan Mehmet 
died and was succeeded by his 13-year-old son.  The Sunni Ottoman’s enemies in the East, the 
Shiite Persians, attacked.  Some things never change.  Faced with a two front war, Sultan Ahmet 
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opened peace talks.93  The situation became more strained as Ferdinand of Stryia, later to 
become Emperor Ferdinand II and a pivotal figure in the Thirty Years War, and Archduke 
Matthias and Emperor Rudolf II, sought to intensify their Counter-Reformation measures in the 
parts of the Empire they controlled.  The Hapsburgs used the lull in fighting as an opportunity to 
try to repress Protestantism in Transylvania and Upper Hungary through the seizure of properties 
and the forced conversion of towns.   
The policy shift was intended to restrict regional political authority and was at odds with 
concessionary Imperial policies.  With the Turkish War still in progress, this policy change was 
foolish, and the Protestants successfully resisted it vigorously.94   Soon the Hapsburg position 
was on the verge of collapse.  Calvinist Istvan Bocskay was acclaimed Prince of Transylvania on 
February 22, 1605, and two months later as ruler of Hungary.   Bocskay’s position was solidified 
when the Sultan designated the territories as Turkish fiefs.  Hostilities then spilled over into 
Ferdinand’s Styria.   
These developments alarmed Archduke Matthias, close ally Bavarian Archduke and 
Wittelsbach family member Maximilian, and soon to be Emperor Ferdinand II, all of whom 
questioned Emperor Rudolf II's ability to govern.  Rudolf II authorized his brother Matthias to 
negotiate with the Turks and Bocskay.  And Matthias recognized that he would have to make 
major political and religious concessions to the Hungarians.95  On June 23, 1606, the Hungarian 
and Transylvanian nobility and Matthias concluded the Treaty of Vienna.  Lutherans and 
Calvinists received formal toleration.  Hungarian financial independence was achieved by its 
recognition as a palatinate which provided Hungary more sovereign privileges.  Hungarians 
replaced German troops on the frontier.  Transylvanian autonomy was also enhanced.  Bocskay 
was declared king but not crowned.  The Habsburgs, moreover, ceded another five Upper 
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Hungarian counties.96  The success of the Hungarians set a most important precedent.  The 
Hungarians and Transylvanians had created and implemented a viable military alliance.  The 
Imperial imposition of militant Catholicism was reversed by Protestant armed force.  The 
Bohemians took note.  In 1618, they would follow the Hungarian and Transylvanian example.97 
The Peace of Vienna, however, cleared the way for Matthias to end debilitating conflicts 
with the Ottomans with the Treaty of Zsitva Torok on November 11, 1606.  That Peace was a 
compromise with both sides recognizing each other as equals.  The arrangement would last for 
20 years removing the chronic financial pressure on the Hapsburgs to fund the military at the 
cost of concessions to the Protestants.98  It is especially noteworthy that The Treaty of Zsitva 
Torok would eventually free future Emperor Ferdinand II to focus his attention and energy on 
the Protestants in Germany during the looming European conflict.  But The Long Turkish War, 
with its financial costs and political consequences, was another in the causal cascade of events 
that contributed to the Thirty Years War. 
The Long Turkish War weakened the Empire and the Emperor.  By 1609, Archduke 
Matthias emerged with domestic power gains in Austria, Moravia and Hungary (Exhibit II).  The 
gains, however, were made at the cost of significantly improving the Protestant Estates' position.  
Emperor Rudolf II also granted steep concessions to the Bohemians and Silesians in his Letter of 
Majesty, essentially empowering local government at the expense of Imperial control.  The 
results of 16 years of international and civil war required Archduke Matthias to grant more 
significant concessions to the Protestant Princes and to enter into a less than desirable peace with 
the Ottomans.99  In addition to the continuous foreign Turkish threat, the domestic political 
situation in the Empire continued to deteriorate in the late 16th Century.  The deterioration 
escalated in the next century, largely due to a Hapsburg Family power struggle.  
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C.  The Brothers’ Quarrel:   
The Hapsburgs were fortunate that the Turkish War abated due to the Sultan’s problems 
with the Persians, but almost immediately the Imperial political focus turned inward with what 
became known as the Brothers' Quarrel.  The Hapsburgs would needlessly squander political 
capital in a power struggle in which arguably all family parties lost.100  The unintended result of 
the Brothers’ Quarrel was the across-the-board strengthening of the Protestant Princes’ position 
and the significant erosion of Hapsburg control and strength in Eastern Europe.101  This 
somewhat complicated series of events is important because they are demonstrative of the serial 
deterioration of Imperial power.  Consequently, the Brothers’ Quarrel would be a  cause of The 
Thirty Years War. 
To understand the genesis of the Brothers’ Quarrel, it is helpful to understand the 
Imperial Family history from 1555, the benchmark date of the Treaty of Augsburg and Emperor 
Charles V’s abdication (Exhibit III).  Over the later part of the 16th Century, developments in the 
Hapsburg family continually weakened the power of the Emperor.  Arguably, the Emperor’s 
biggest strength was his reach throughout the Empire and the concentration of Imperial power in 
one person.  The Empire had been initially weakened with the abdication of Charles V.  Charles 
was a consummate soldier and a commanding figure.  He was indeed repressive, but his subjects 
identified with him.102  When Charles V abdicated in 1555, he split the Empire leaving his 
brother Ferdinand I with the eastern, Austrian-based half and the Emperor’s title.  Ferdinand I’s 
nephew King Philip II of Spain was a close ally, but not a vassal, and was fully occupied with 
problems of his own in the Netherlands.  Charles V's partition of the Empire between Spain and 
Austria geographically halved the Empire and it also halved its power.  Although Spain and the 
Hapsburgs were aligned they were no longer unified.103   
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Ferdinand I was faced with pressing problems that would vex him and his successors in 
Hungary and Transylvania, as well as the ongoing Turkish threat.  It was in Ferdinand’s interest 
to have support from the Catholics and the Protestants.  The structure of the Imperial 
Constitution, as we have seen, necessitated his reliance on the Estate holders for funding.  His 
indulgence of the Protestants, however, was a step toward their increasing power and the 
diminishing power of the Emperor.104   
When Ferdinand I died in 1564, the Austrian state debt had risen fivefold to ten million 
florins.105    Annual debt service, moreover, was 1.5 million florins a year and the defense of the 
frontier required and additional 1.0 million florins.  Ferdinand’s personal debt was 1.5 million 
florins.  The Emperor’s solution to this problem was embodied in his last will and testament.  He 
entrusted succeeding Imperial governance to a senior line of his six sons and established two 
junior branches for others.  The effect was to spread the debt, but it also spread power, and again 
the beneficiaries were the Protestant Estates.106  Ferdinand I’s son, Maximilian II, largely 
followed his father’s policies until his death in 1576.  Peter Wilson believes that the problems 
facing the Austrian Hapsburgs explain both the initial Bohemian Revolt and the spread of the 
War.  They stemmed from the dynastic weakness following Charles V's separation of Spain and 
its possessions from the Empire and later, after Ferdinand I’s death, the internal partition of 
Austria in 1564 into three sub-branches.107 
Faced with an ever mounting Protestant population and mounting debt, the Hapsburgs 
continually had to compromise.  Upper and Lower Austria obtained the Religious Assurance 
(Assecuation) in 1568 and 1571 respectively, gaining religious freedoms in return for the 
payment of 2.5 million florins of Hapsburg debt.  In 1572, Inner Austria paid off another 1.0 
million for similar freedoms.  In 1578, the concessions were consolidated into the The 
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Pacification of Bruck (Brucker Libell), granted in return for regular tax payments to maintain 
border defenses against the Turks.   
The Austrian Protestant Princes paid dearly for their religious freedoms and would not 
give them up easily.108  By 1585, Catholicism was under severe pressure.  Nine in ten Lower 
Austrian nobles had embraced Lutheranism, as had 85% in Upper Austria where 75% of 
urbanites and half the peasants were Protestants.  In Inner Austria, 70% had abandoned Rome 
and only five of 135 Styrian nobles were Catholic.  By 1572, 16 of 22 Styrian (Inner or Central 
Austrian) towns were Lutheran.  Protestant nobles continuously lobbied through the Estates for 
concessions from the Hapsburgs.109   
The Catholic nobility’s eventual response to this string of Imperial concessions was a 
policy of entrenchment.  Rather than revoking privileges granted, they fiercely resisted any new 
ones.  The implementation of any new privileges allowed would be subject to their strict 
interpretation of the terms and conditions under which they were granted.  The Catholics 
believed that the Protestant Estates were a necessary evil.  After all, the Empire depended on 
their funding.  Governmentally, however, Catholics were nearly always favored and promoted 
over their Protestant rivals.110 
In 1576, Maximilian II’s eldest son and Ferdinand I’s grandson, Rudolf II succeeded 
him.  Rudolf II and his immediately younger brother Archduke Matthias were the antagonists in 
the family fight.  Rudolf II was an introvert.  He did not like ruling the Empire, and in 
governance, the Jesuits and the Spanish Court influenced him heavily.111  Intelligent but inept 
and eccentric, Rudolf II began to show signs of mental illness.  He devoted all his time to a 
coterie of painters, philosophers, scientists, writers, magicians and hangers on.  Rudolf II loved 
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astronomy, natural history, chemistry and antiquities and surrounded himself with natural 
philosophers to indulge his interests; he became increasingly reclusive.   
His brother Archduke Matthias urged Rudolf II to proclaim him King of the Romans.  
The title King of the Romans designated the presumptive heir to the Imperial throne.  When 
Rudolf II rejected the proposition, Matthias connived with young Ferdinand of Stryia and 
eventual Emperor and Archduke Maximilian.  Archduke Maximilian ruled Catholic Bavaria.  He 
could and would raise armies and was a powerful ally of Matthias and young Ferdinand.  If 
Emperor Rudolf II died without an heir, the Protestant Electors of Palatine and Saxony would 
serve as Imperial Vicars.  Consequently, the possibility of a Protestant Emperor was not a far 
reach.112  This resulted in the soap opera like, high stakes family intramurals, which became 
known as the Bruderzwist (the Brothers Quarrel). 
 In January, 1608, Emperor Rudolf II convened a Diet in Regensburg.   Its purpose was to 
provide funding for continuing efforts against the Turks.  The Protestant Estates demanded that 
the issue of the Ecclesiastical Reservation of the Treaty of Augsburg be debated as part of the 
Diet’s agenda.  Recall that the Treaty provided that if a cleric converted to Protestantism, all his 
rights, territories and privileges would be forfeit.  Charged by Rudolf II with administering the 
Diet, young future Emperor Ferdinand’s primary goal was to obtain funding for 24,000 Imperial 
troops necessary to defend against the Turks.  The Protestants, however, would not approve the 
funds without concessions to the Religious Peace.    
Independently, Archduke Matthias then formed an alliance with Hungary and Upper and 
Lower Austria to keep the peace with the Turks, and began to organize an army to confront 
Rudolf II.  Emperor Rudolf II accused Matthias and his allies of rebellion.  Young Ferdinand was 
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caught between the conflicting Brothers and did his best to stay neutral as the Brothers jockeyed 
for political position.113  Perhaps a better name for this struggle is The Brothers’ Battle. 
Young Ferdinand continued in his efforts to convince the Protestant Estates to approve 
military funding.  In yet another bout over the Ecclesiastical Reservation, they refused unless the 
Diet agreed to allow the recognition of the Protestant confiscation of Church property after 
1552.  Young Ferdinand stood with Archduke Maximilian in enforcing the hard line against the 
Protestants on the Religious Peace.  This, in conjunction with the continuing strife with the 
Hapsburg house, caused the Diet to collapse.114  The 1608 Diet of Regensburg was a total 
failure.  Imperial troops were not funded and no progress was made on religious differences.  
The failed Diet increased distrust and suspicions on both sides.115  The Brothers’ Quarrel further 
weakened the Empire by leading Protestant Princes to believe that violent confrontation would 
result in advancing their political and religious goals.116  The Protestant case for armed rebellion, 
and all its consequences, was gaining momentum. 
Rudolf II's erratic behavior convinced the Archdukes that they needed to act, and they 
agreed to accept Matthias as sole successor to Rudolf II.  But Rudolf II’s determined resistance 
deterred the Electors from open support of Matthias while Rudolf II lived.  The Hapsburg family 
feud ended the hope of settling succession issues without recourse to further concessions to the 
Protestant Estates.   
The Brothers would become involved in a series of trade-offs to cement their positions.117  
The rights of the Protestant Princes and the spread of the Reformation were ascending; Rudolph 
II's Imperial power was deteriorating.  Fearful of Rudolf II's impotency, his brothers met and 
assigned all their powers to Matthias.  The House of Hapsburg was now in tacit revolt against the 
Emperor, and the Protestants quickly embraced the accommodating Matthias.118  
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On June 25, 1608, hostility was avoided between the Brothers with the signing of the 
Treaty of Lieben.  The Treaty granted near Imperial status to Matthias in the eastern part of the 
Empire.  Rudolf II was compelled to surrender the Hungarian Crown of Saint Stephen to 
Matthias and recognize him as ruler of Moravia and Upper and Lower Austria.  The Moravians 
received greater autonomy from Bohemia. The Austrians, Moravians and Hungarians forged 
their own alliance.119  
The Austrians were under the leadership of Baron Tschernaembl.  As a Calvinist, he was 
a minority in opposition to the Hapsburgs, but argued that Rudolf II's renunciation of his 
Austrian authority created an interregnum.  On October 3, 1608, the assembled radicals declared 
their formal secession from the Empire and established an alternative government in Upper and 
Lower Austria.  Matthias rushed to dissuade them, but the Austrians refused to grant him 
recognition unless he made more religious concessions, and Matthias complied.120  On March 19, 
1609, Matthias further mollified the Austrians by halting Catholic reform and providing a verbal 
assurance of support to freedom of religion in Austrian towns.  Young Ferdinand was bitterly 
opposed to these concessions, calling them “vexing and scornful.”121  The Catholic gains of the 
prior 30 years were swept aside. 
The Bohemians remained under the rule of Rudolf II with the understanding that Mathias 
would succeed him.  On July 9, 1609, in return for their recognition, Rudolf II signed the 
infamous Letter of Majesty establishing equality between the Emperor and the adherents to the 
Confession Bohemica – that is the Ultraquists, Bohemian Brethren, Lutherans and Calvinists.  
The confessional adherents were allowed to appoint pastors, control the university, and name a 
committee of Defensors independent of the king.  They were also allowed to build churches and 
schools on royal lands.122  Rudolf II’s concessions exceeded those granted the Austrians by 
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Matthias, and the Bohemian Catholics were cast aside.  On August 20, 1609, the Silesians 
extracted a similar Letter.   
Matthias won the Brothers’ Quarrel but it was a Pyrrhic victory.  In 1611, Rudolf II was 
stripped of his authority and remained Emperor only in title.  Matthias became King of Bohemia, 
but his crown came with further costs.  The Bohemians demanded the free exercise of religion 
and elected 30 Defensors empowered to raise an army.  In response, Matthias capitulated and 
signed Rudolf’s Letter of Majesty.  The Bohemian Protestants were given control of the 
University of Prague and granted a Consistory, (or Church Court) independent of the 
Archbishop.  Bohemia became a quasi republic.   Imperial power was reduced to figurehead 
status.  The German Protestant Princes took note; the power of the Protestant Estates continued 
to strengthen.123  On May 23, 1611, only after granting these concessions including recognition 
of the Letter of Majesty, Matthias was crowned King of Bohemia.124 
Rudolf II was effectively no longer in power but the formal issue of Imperial succession 
was still undecided.  In December 1611, a family conference was held in Vienna.  Present were 
Matthias, Archdukes Ferdinand, Maximilian, young Ferdinand's son Johann Carl, the Spanish 
ambassador representing King Philip III, and a representative of Archduke Albert.  They decided 
to support Matthias for King of the Romans and heir apparent.125  Matthias had opposition from 
Catholics who credibly believed that he was too eager to appease the Protestants, but some were 
softening.  The soon to be elevated to Cardinal Klesl, close advisor to Matthias, had initially 
opposed Matthias' concessions but modified his position because they were politique.  That is, 
they were necessary for the greater good.  Only with Protestant support could the Turks be held 
at bay.  Ever consistent, young Ferdinand remained in bitter opposition.126  
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On January 26, 1612, Rudolf II died and on June 13, Mathias succeeded him as Emperor.  
On August 13, 1613, in a continuing effort to finance the military and resolve religious issues, 
another Imperial Diet was assembled.  It met with the same entrenched positions of the parties.  
On October 22, Emperor Mathias prolonged the Diet to May 1, 1614, but it never reconvened.127  
Time after time, the Protestant Princes confronted a succession of Hapsburg Emperors.  Time 
after time, the Emperors agreed to major concessions.  The cumulative effect of these actions 
was the erosion of the Emperor’s power and prestige and another cause of The Thirty Years War. 
D.  German Political Crises and Increasing Confessional Tensions: 
The Brothers’ Quarrel was focused not on Germany but primarily on events in the eastern 
kingdoms of the Empire and the Ottoman Empire.  Important and concurrent with the significant 
events in the eastern Empire, tensions rose in Germany.  The political fortunes of the Calvinists 
and the Hapsburgs continued to ebb and flow.  In the early 17th Century there were two regional 
crises, one of which threatened the Empire with foreign intervention.   
The Donauwörth Incident added fuel to an already combustible situation.  In 1606, the 
Protestant city council forbade the Catholic minority from a public display of faith, and the 
Catholics rioted.  Emperor Rudolf II placed the city under Imperial Ban, revoked its privileges 
and replaced Lutheran administrators with Catholics.  He removed Donauwörth from the 
Protestant Swabian Circle and placed it within the Catholic Bavarian Circle.128  In 1607, 
Bavarian Archduke Maximilian enforced the Ban and seized the city as payment for his services 
to the Empire.  He then reinstituted Catholicism and repressed Protestantism with tacit Imperial 
approval.  The Protestant Princes viewed the Donauwörth incident as a pure and simple Imperial 
power grab.  This Imperial action contributed to the ruin of the Diet of 1608, and the Protestant’s 
walkout from it. 129  On May 12, 1608, after the failure of the 1608 Diet, an alliance of Protestant 
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states headed by the Elector Palatine, Wüttenberg, Baden-Durlach, Ansbach, Lulmbach, 
Newburg, Hessen-Kassel, Zweibruken, Brandenburg and a number of southern German cities 
formed the Protestant Union.130  The Protestants designed the Union as a defense against any 
aggression from the Catholics, but it was an organization empowered to raise an army.131  
A subsequent chain of events in Germany nearly led to Pan-European war.  Jülich-Cleves 
was of strategic importance as it straddled the Spanish Road – the supply line from Italy to the 
Netherlands.  Spain maintained a major military presence in the Italian territories under its 
control.  The Spanish Road was so named because it was the only viable land route to the 
Spanish Netherlands through Switzerland and Germany.  Consequently, it was of vital strategic 
importance.  Any political issues associated with it directly involved Spanish and French, as well 
as Imperial interests.132  The Jülich-Cleves Crisis commenced when Duke John William died 
without an heir on March 25, 1609.  This gave Emperor Rudolf II an opportunity to assert his 
power.  He appointed his cousin Archduke Leopold, Bishop of Passau and Strasbourg, as 
Imperial Commissioner to take possession of the territory.  This action was hotly contested by a 
host of conflicting parties.  When Leopold seized the fortress at Jülich, Brandenburg and 
Neuburg agreed that the city would be jointly occupied.  Netherland’s Maurice of Orange, 
reinforced by English troops, then expelled Leopold and occupied the city with Dutch troops.  
The French, under King Henry IV, were allied with the English and Dutch.  Only Henry’s 
assassination on May 14, 1610, and the overthrow of Rudolf II and his subsequent death, 
prevented the outbreak of a European conflict.133  War was avoided, but the crisis contributed 
significantly to political destabilization.  Protestant Princes started fortifying towns and building 
defense works.134  The Imperial parochial actions further inflamed the Protestants. 
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In 1609, the Catholics responded to the Protestant League with their own confederation, 
the Catholic League (Liga), led by Bavaria's Archduke Maximilian.  The Liga initially consisted 
of seven Catholic Bishoprics.  Subsequently, Bamberg and 19 Swabian prelates were recruited.  
This group constituted the southern directory of the Liga.  A second Rhenish directory was led 
by Mainz and included Cologne, Trier and the bishoprics of Speyer and Worms.  Like the Union, 
the Liga proposed to operate under the Imperial Constitution.  But as opposed confessional 
organizations, capable of raising taxes and armies, the formation of the Union and the Liga 
represented political structures capable of waging war with each other.135   Both the Protestant 
and Catholic Confessions now had institutions capable of independently organized violence.   
The Union and the Liga were provisional military arrangements formed as offsets against 
each other.136  The Arrangements were ultimately dissolved after the Jülich-Cleves Crisis 
without conflict.  But it is noteworthy that the Protestant and Catholic Confessions were now 
independently capable of arming and engaging in armed conflict outside the purview of the 
Emperor. 
The Jülich-Cleves dispute hardened Protestant and Catholic positions and highlighted the 
reliance of both sides on outside financial and military support.  Cardinal Klesl, chief advisor to 
Emperor Mathias, sought to exploit the situation by forming a conciliatory Composition of the 
religious factions to consolidate the Emperor's position as an arbiter.  But despite some bilateral 
support, neither the Liga nor the Union was willing to compromise.137 
Grayling tells his readers that none of the emperors in the decades before 1618 managed 
to establish unitary control over all the Empire.  The Donauwörth and the Jülich-Cleves crises 
are important because they highlight that the Hapsburgs’ eroding fortunes spanned the entire 
Empire.  The Imperial House alternated between strong-arm tactics at Donauwörth and a major 
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concession by Rudolf II in his Letter of Majesty to the Bohemians.  The conflicting tactics 
weakened Imperial strength, credibility and prestige.  The continual Imperial softness and 
willingness to buckle to Protestant Estates’ demands contributed to the eventual outbreak of war.  
The cumulative damaging effects of the Augsburg Treaty, the Hapsburg’s purposeful dilution of 
Imperial power, its penchant for concessions, its family dysfunction, and its willingness to act 
capriciously were moving the Empire and Europe toward tragic conflict.  It was entirely 
reasonable for the Protestant Estates to believe that their fortunes were on the rise, but they 
completely and tragically underestimated the soon to be Emperor Ferdinand II.138 
E.  The Bohemian Revolt – Ferdinand elected and deposed as King of Bavaria and 
succeeded by Frederick – Ferdinand elected Holy Roman Emperor: 
 
The ultimate cause of the start of the War was the Bohemian Revolt.  Powerful 
antagonists, Catholic Ferdinand II and Protestant Frederick V and their actions, ignited the 
conflict.  In 1603, the Landgrave of Hessen converted to Calvinism.  In 1613, the Elector 
Brandenburg followed.139   The Protestant conversion of Germany accelerated.  Catholic 
centralized power in the Empire increasingly struggled against the power of the Protestant 
Estates.  This coincided with Catholic fear and hatred of the Calvinists and the spread of 
Calvinist influence in the Estates and the cities.140  Since 1526, when the Hapsburgs gained 
control of Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia and Lusatia, the territories had been governed by a group of 
Catholic aristocrats.  They were in permanent conflict with the interests of the Protestant nobility 
jealous of their ancient feudal rights.141 
In Bohemia, the religious spectrum was diverse and by 1600, Catholics were reduced to 
only 15% of the population.  The political situation was complicated; the Estates believed that 
their freedoms were God-given and not subject to mortal authority.  Crown and Estates disputes 
were to be settled by bilateral, mutually advantageous arrangements, fluid and subject to ongoing 
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compromise.  These sentiments were deeply entrenched in Bohemian culture.142  The Kingdoms 
of Bohemia and Hungary were heavily majority Protestant, and the kingdoms were also exempt 
from regio eius religio.  Consequently, the Hapsburgs could not force Catholicism on their 
subjects.  
These monarchies, moreover, were elected offices.  Each new king had to agree to 
concessions to the majority upon election.  Consequently, resistance to the Counter-Reformation 
was stubborn and effective.  In 1609, the Estates of Bohemia, Silesia, and Lusatia mobilized an 
army and forced Emperor Rudolf II to sign The Letter of Majesty.  This letter allowed 
Bohemians to practice Catholicism or any creed of the Bohemian Confession.  It gave nobles, 
knights, and towns the right to build churches, even on royal lands.  These results proved to the 
Bohemian Estates that violent resistance was effective.143 
The Bohemian nobles exploited the family rift between the Hapsburgs by forming 
Confederations with the Estates of Austria, Moravia, Hungary and Silesia.  Matthias had to buy 
allegiance from Austria, Hungary and Moravia with far-reaching concessions to local interests 
which essentially transformed these countries into aristocratic republics.  On May 23, 1611, 
Matthias was elected King, confirmed the Letter and offered more concessions.144  
The Bohemian Protestants understood that their protections under the Letter of Majesty 
were provisional.  They sought alliances in the form of contributions for a new Protestant Church 
in the Old Town of Prague.  Contributors were James I of England, and the Protestant Electors of 
Brunswick, Hesse and Wüttenberg.  Young Ferdinand held the Bohemian Calvinists responsible.  
He believed that the nobles of the region had been indoctrinated into a state of rebellion and 
opposition to lawful authority.145  The Protestants also erected a new church in the little town of 
Klostergrab.   The lawfulness of the construction was contested by Emperor Matthias, the church 
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was demolished and its most vigorous supporters imprisoned.  The Protestant opposition now 
known as the The Defensors, under the leadership of Count Thurn, vigorously objected.  The 
Emperor stood his ground and denounced their conduct as illegal and rebellious.146  With the 
closure of a church in Braunau, in addition to razing the church in Klostergrab, Emperor 
Matthias demonstrated his willingness to work against the Letter of Majesty.  This was in spite 
of his agreement to adhere to it.  His church actions presented another Imperial mixed message 
to the Protestants. 
The Bohemian Protestant Estates were determined not to give back any concessions that 
they had gained.147  Emperor Matthias, moreover, angered his Bohemian subjects by appointing 
Catholics to leadership positions on the Council of Regents in Prague.  The Regents then insisted 
on the restoration of Catholic properties.  In turn, the Protestants sent a letter to the Emperor 
demanding autonomy and that only Protestants could occupy governing positions.148  Emperor 
Matthias rejected their appeal and banned them from any further meetings.149 
In early 1617, Emperor Mathias took ill.  This prompted concerns about succession in 
Bohemia.  On June 5th in Prague, Emperor Mathias, young Ferdinand, Maximilian and Cardinal 
Klesl greeted the Bohemian Estates.  Mathias proposed Ferdinand because of his comparative 
young age; Archdukes Maximilian and Albert renounced their claims.  The next day the 
Bohemian Estates were called to vote as individual members, not representatives of corporate 
entities, knights, cities, etc.  All voted to accept Ferdinand except Count Thurn.  This was a 
major error by the Protestants.  It would be difficult, if not impossible, for the Protestant 
Bohemian Estates to justify revolt one year later after they had formally accepted Ferdinand as 
King.150 
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The Bohemian violent revolution actually began well after the designation of Ferdinand 
as the successor to Mathias as King of Bohemia.  As a condition of Ferdinand’s coronation, the 
Bohemian Estates demanded that Ferdinand confirm all their rights including the Letter of 
Majesty.  He complied, and on June, 29, 1617, he was crowned.151   But after Ferdinand's 
election, pro-Catholic policies expanded and restrictions were placed on the Prague press.  After 
imposing these policies, Emperor Matthias and Ferdinand left ten Regents in their stead to 
govern and departed Prague for Vienna.  
On May 23, 1618, members of the Estates Royal, led by Count Thurn, went to the royal 
castle in Prague to declare Emperor Matthias' and King Ferdinand’s Regents public enemies.  
They confronted two Catholic Regents and a secretary and threw them out a third story window.  
Somehow they survived.  This event became known as the Defenestration of Prague.152  The 
Protestants seized control of the government and expelled the hated Jesuits.  Bohemia was now 
in rebellion, and this date is generally acknowledged by historians as the beginning of the Thirty 
Years War.153  The Bohemian Revolt would be the last attempt of feudal nobility to preserve and 
extend their prerogatives against centralized Imperial authority.154 
The Bohemians had crossed the Rubicon.  Their actions could not be ignored as they 
would most certainly inspire similar uprisings throughout the Empire.  Ferdinand, soon to be 
Emperor, and the crowned King of Bohemia, congratulated Emperor Matthias on the event: 
"Disobedience, lawlessness and insurrection went always hand-in-hand with Protestantism." 155  
He added that all the concessions granted by the Emperor had been abused, served to increase 
Protestant demands and targeted Imperial authority.  Security for the Catholic Faith and the 
Empire required eradication by force.156  Ferdinand’s statements were a harbinger of things to 
come.  After some infighting at the Imperial Court in Vienna, Ferdinand was charged with 
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Imperial responsibility for the affairs of Bohemia with final decisions to be made by Emperor 
Matthias.  Ferdinand was left with no recourse initially but to adopt a moderate policy.  He 
simply did not have the resources to put down the rebellion.157   
Ferdinand, however, maneuvered in the background to strengthen his position.  Matthias 
preferred to negotiate; Ferdinand preferred to fight.  Ferdinand regarded himself as the successor 
to the childless Matthias for the Imperial Crown and those of Austria, Bohemia and Hungary.  
Members of the Hapsburg house were alarmed.  They were concerned because of his close and 
constant association with the Jesuits and their staunch, zealous and uncompromising Catholic 
orthodoxy.  If the Hapsburgs were alarmed, the Protestants were terrified.158  Previously, in 
August 1614, Matthias had endorsed Ferdinand as his successor.  But now Ferdinand faced 
serious opposition.  The Spanish Crown had a claim to the Emperor’s Throne.   
Ferdinand secretly negotiated with the Spanish, and they agreed to recognize him as 
Matthias’ successor.159   On March 20, 1617, Ferdinand agreed to give up Alsace and two 
associated territories of Hagenau and Ortenau to Spain.  Ferdinand would also receive a payment 
one million talers.160  In return, the Spanish Crown would renounce its claim.161  This 
unconstitutional arrangement freed Ferdinand to pursue his Bohemian agenda.  
Matthias’ powerful advisor Cardinal Klesl also opposed Ferdinand.  Klesl was 
determined to restore Imperial prestige, and restoring faith in Imperial justice was essential.  He 
sought to achieve this through Amicabilis Composition, or a friendly compromise on religion 
negotiated outside the formal Imperial framework.  Klesl hoped to accomplish this through a 
bipartisan committee of equal numbered Catholics and Protestants.  The committee would 
resolve contentious issues separately, so as not to disrupt Imperial institutions.  Klesl also 
perhaps correctly believed that Catholicism would never fully recover and he accepted the 
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erosion of the Imperial Church as inevitable.162  Ferdinand’s zealous Counter-Reformation stance 
represented an obstacle to Klesl’s policy’s implementation.  Klesl thus delayed succession 
resolution from 1615 to 1617 in an effort to achieve the Protestant and Catholic alliance.163 
Ferdinand’s next step in his consolidation of power was to prevent Matthias from 
negotiating with the Bohemians.  In June 1616, Archduke Maximilian and Ferdinand decided to 
rid themselves of Cardinal Klesl and commenced planning to do so.164  Ferdinand arranged for 
Klesl to be permanently removed from the scene.165  On July 29, 2018, Klesl was kidnapped and 
placed under close confinement; Emperor Matthias reluctantly agreed to his removal.166  Had 
Klesl been successful in arranging his Amicabilis Compositio between the confessions, political 
tensions may have abated and the march toward war averted.  Ferdinand then persuaded Matthias 
to take up arms against the Bohemians.  Matthias, despite a general lack of support, raised an 
Army under Flemish General Bucquoy to attack Prague.167 
On March 20, 1619, Emperor Matthias died.168  One week later, Ferdinand offered the 
Bohemians quasi independence, indemnity and reconfirmation of their constitutional privileges 
if they laid down their arms and sued for mercy.  They declined.  Ferdinand suggested another 
round of negotiations. They again declined.  Then, under the leadership of Count Thurn, 
Bohemia invaded Moravia with 8,000 men and annexed it.  Then he invaded Austria.169 
All Ferdinand's proposals to the Bohemian rebels were rejected.  Count Thurn marched to 
the gates of Vienna where Ferdinand was protected by only a handful of troops.  Sixteen 
Protestant Austrian nobles forced their way into Ferdinand's chambers and insisted that he sign a 
Confederation with the Bohemians.  One grabbed Ferdinand by his tunic and demanded his 
signature.  Ferdinand realized that his capitulation would be the end of his authority, and that 
fleeing the Imperial Capitol would mean the end of the Empire.  He refused to sign.  If Ferdinand 
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had capitulated, Imperial authority probably would have been permanently blunted, perhaps to 
the point that war could have been averted.    
At this moment, Schiller tells his readers, a friendly regiment of heavy cavalry, followed 
by infantry, marched into the city to defend the Emperor.  Coincident with this, news arrived that 
Ferdinand's Flemish General Bucquoy had defeated the Protestants under Count Mansfield at 
Budweiss and was marching on Prague.  Count Thurn withdrew literally from the gates of 
Vienna and moved to protect his Bohemian Capitol.  It is not hard to understand that Ferdinand 
viewed these events as a Divine intervention.170  The road, literally and figuratively, was now 
opened for Ferdinand's coronation as Holy Roman Emperor. 
After Emperor Matthias’ death, the Elector of Mainz called upon the Electors to meet in 
Frankfort on July 20, 1619, to elect a new emperor.  Despite the existing political turmoil, Mainz 
felt that more liberal Imperial concessions would facilitate the electoral process.  Militant 
Protestant Palatine Elector Frederick V pressured for a postponement.  We shall see that he 
becomes a key figure in the upcoming conflict.  Frederick V objected to the Throne being a 
Hapsburg heritable right and to the Jesuit’s influence with Ferdinand and his ardent Catholicism.  
Mainz rejected his arguments, and the other Electors complied with Mainz’ position.  The 
conduct of the Hapsburgs during the Jülich-Cleves Crisis and Ferdinand's position on the 
Bohemian question had convinced Frederick V that the Hapsburgs were a serious threat to the 
Constitution and Protestant religious liberty. 171 
Frederick V favored Maximilian of Austria as Emperor, as Maximilian was a fellow 
member of the Wittelsbach family.  Maximilian, however, was a staunch Catholic and closely 
aligned with Ferdinand.  But Maximilian was family and Frederick V believed that Maximilian 
could be elected, as Maximilian's brother was the Cologne Elector.  If Frederick V could get 
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Elector Brandenburg and Saxony to go along, Maximilian would be elected.  Since 1616, 
Frederick V had lobbied this position.   
Frederick V chose not to attend the election but sent a delegation.  Its instructions were to 
stall.  They were to attempt to persuade the Electors of Trier, Cologne, Saxony and Brandenburg 
that the greatest threat to the Empire was the hereditary right to the Throne by the Hapsburgs.  
He also wanted breathing room for negotiations on Bohemia.172  Frederick V’s delegation was 
ordered to pressure Saxony’s Lutheran Elector John George.  They warned him "how 
irresponsible it would be against God, the other Protestant Estates, and worthy posterity, when, at 
this election, one had set and given himself and all Protestantism wholly into the opponent's will 
and power, so to speak." 173  During the election, Frederick V demonstrated his tendency to 
believe what he wished and to expect what he hoped for.  Indeed, he wished God's blessing on 
Ferdinand because he believed that Ferdinand had the good fortune to be hated by everyone.174  
Frederick V, if nothing else, was consistent. 
On August 28, four Imperial Electors and three Elector delegations convened in the 
Election Chapel, and the Duke of Cologne announced that Maximilian would not stand for 
election.   In the ensuing vote, as sitting King of Bohemia, Ferdinand voted for himself.  The 
three ecclesiastic Catholic Electors also voted for him.  His election assured, Protestant Saxony 
and Brandenburg followed suit.  Frederick V's delegation had no choice but to concur or be 
viewed as obstructionists, which indeed they were.  Soon to be deposed of the Crown of 
Bohemia, Ferdinand was now soon to be the Holy Roman Emperor.175  Frederick V's delegation 
then pressed for concessions, and Emperor-Elect Ferdinand II, in his required Capitulation, 
agreed to almost all the demands.  He agreed to uphold the Golden Bull, the Peace of Augsburg 
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and the Imperial Liberties.  Ferdinand also agreed to make no foreign alliances or bring foreign 
troops into the Empire.176 
Meanwhile, Bohemian efforts to gain allies met with little success. Almost every 
Protestant Prince denied support.  The Bohemian crisis might have been another in a series of 
serious but local issues, but Palatine Elector Frederic V provided the Bohemians with immediate 
recognition and assistance.  Frederick V sent his Grand Chamberlain to dissuade the rebels from 
making peace.  He offered support from the Protestant Union.  He sent an army of 4,000 men to 
Bohemia to fight the Emperor, which strengthened Bohemian resolve.177 
The Estates of all the lands of the Bohemian Crown formed a Confederation.  They were: 
Moravia, Silesia, Upper and Lower Lusatia and Bohemia proper.  They deposed Ferdinand II and 
on August 26, 1619 elected Frederick V King.   Frederick V’s acceptance as Ferdinand II’s 
successor all but guaranteed the spread of hostilities into the heart of Europe.  The Estates of 
Upper and Lower Austria, moreover, allied with the rebels.  The Bohemians also coordinated 
military efforts with Bethlen Gabor, Prince of Transylvania and a minion of the Turks.178  The 
rebels sought to renew confederation with the Silesian and Lusatian Estates and the Moravian 
and Austrian Estates.  They were anxious to ally with the United Provinces, England, Sweden 
and the Protestant Union to mobilize the whole of anti-Hapsburg Europe.  They failed. 
A minority of the rebel leaders wished to establish a republic on the Dutch or Swiss 
model.  The majority wanted a nominal head of state.  The German Princes were horrified.  So 
were James I of England and Louis XIII of France.  Protestants Charles Emmanuel of Savoy and 
John George of Saxony withdrew support.  All this notwithstanding, the rebels declared King 
Ferdinand deposed and elected Frederick V to replace him.  It would prove to be a disastrous 
mistake.   
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In support of the new Emperor Ferdinand II, the Grand-Duke of Tuscany sent money; 
Archduke Maximilian of Bavaria pledged an army of 30,000 men.  The King of Spain, Philip III, 
funded an army in the Spanish Netherlands to attack the Palatinate.  Protestant Elector John 
George of Saxony subjugated Lusatia and Silesia.  On July 3, 1620, under pressure from the 
French and English, the Protestant Union declared its neutrality.  The Empire’s only remaining 
dangerous adversary was Bethlen of Transylvania.  With the permission of his overlord the 
Sultan, Bethlen occupied large portions of Hungary and was the elected King.  But Bethlen was 
bought off as the Sultan needed to address his interests in Poland and respond to a Persian 
advance into Mesopotamia.  Nothing of any substance now stood in Ferdinand II’s way.  
Maximilian’s General Tilly occupied Upper Austria.  The Spanish General Spinola invaded the 
Palatinate.  On November 8, 1620, Tilly and Bucquoy marched into Bohemia and crushed the 
Bohemian rebels at the Battle of White Mountain.  The Bohemian government immediately 
collapsed. 179 
Historian Josef Polisensky did not believe that religion was the cause of the Bohemian 
Rebellion.  He saw it as a conflict between two socio-economic structures.  The Bohemian 
Estates fought "not for the ideals of religious, social and national radicalism, but for the order of 
Estates against that of a revived feudalism, for the idea of a Bohemian State against that of the 
all-embracing monarchy, for religious tolerance against dogmatic bigotry."180  They did not so 
much want to change the monarchy as its religious policy.181  The Bohemian War was the start of 
and the ultimate causal event of The Thirty Years War.  There were many opportunities to avoid 
the War’s outbreak.  These chances, however, became impossible when the irresistible force 
represented by Ferdinand II, collided with the immovable object, Frederick V. 
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F.  The Prince of Styria and eventual Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand II: 
Frederich Schiller, however, believed that all significant events in early modern Germany 
either originated in or became associated with questions of religion.  The House of Hapsburg 
directed its powers almost exclusively against the Reformation.182   We have seen that after the 
1555 Augsburg Peace, Hapsburg power and influence steadily eroded, as the Protestant 
Reformation swept over Europe.  For the next 63 years, the Imperial House made concession 
after concession to the ascending Protestant Princes.  In 1618, parts of the Empire were 
effectively divorced from the central power of the Catholic Church and Imperial Rule.  The tide 
of change clearly favored the decentralized Protestants.  All this would abruptly change under 
the rule of Ferdinand II. 
Hapsburg Emperor and staunch Catholic, Ferdinand II was a crucial figure in the Thirty 
Years War.  He reinvigorated the office of Holy Roman Emperor after its decline under 
predecessors.183  Ferdinand’s inflexible Catholic zeal and application of Jesuit inspired Counter-
Reformation policies, would lead to a personal, Princely confrontation with Frederick V.  That 
confrontation would result in the start of the War.   
Ferdinand's father was the Archduke Carl II of Carniola, Carinthia and Styria and the 
youngest brother of Maximilian II.184  Ferdinand's mother was the formidable Wittelsbach Maria 
of Bavaria.  Her marriage to Hapsburg Archduke Carl united the rival houses.185  In 1578, Carl 
agreed to the Pacification of Bruck.  The Pacification agreed to the recognition of free exercise 
of religion for nobility and allowed for the maintenance of Protestant preachers.  Protestant 
churches were allowed in Graz, Langenfurt, Ljubljana and Judenburg.  In what was becoming an 
all too familiar scenario, Carl consented because he was desperate for funds.186  The Pacification 
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of Bruck struck alarm in Rome as it was feared it would lead to the advance of Protestantism in 
Gorizia, Triest and Fiume, and from there into Italy.  The Pope excommunicated the Archduke.  
Despite his excommunication, Carl sought the dispatch of Jesuits to his city of Gratz and 
indicated his intention to restore Catholicism in his territories.187 
In his will, Carl called for the disinheritance of his children if they converted to 
Protestantism and required them to maintain the Catholic faith in their lands.  He also stressed 
that his heirs were not bound by the Pacification of Bruck.  Ferdinand was 12 when Carl died.188  
Carl named four guardians for Ferdinand:  Emperor Rudolf II, his brother Archduke Ferdinand 
Governor of The Tyrol and Anterior Austria, his brother-in-law Duke William of Bavaria and his 
wife and Ferdinand's mother Maria.  Ferdinand would not rule until he reached his majority on 
his 18th birthday.189 
The Jesuits accepted Archduke Carl’s invitation and established a college in Graz.  The 
Jesuits became Carl's strong allies in an effort to maintain the Catholic Church in Inner Austria.  
When the college was elevated to the status of a university, eight-year-old Ferdinand was the 
first student to have his name inscribed in the book of matriculation.  In 1590, the year of his 
father's death, Ferdinand moved to the Jesuit University in Ingolstadt, Bavaria.  He studied there 
for five years.  Ferdinand considered the Jesuits essential for the defense and propagation of the 
faith.  He stated in his last will and testament on May 10, 1621: 
In the first place, with special concern we earnestly commend to you the well-
deserving Society of Jesus and its priests. . . . In this ungrateful and perverse 
world they encounter more hatred and persecution than others and so are more in 
need of protection, help and assistance.190 
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In addition to his Jesuit education, Ferdinand was raised in the Court of William, Duke of 
Bavaria.  There he was taught that the perceived liberal attitude of the Empire was due to the 
Protestants who were the source of all political difficulties.191   
Ferdinand was raised as a devout Catholic at Court and at Ingolstadt in Bavaria where his 
mother's brother, Duke William oversaw his education.192  Duke William counseled Ferdinand to 
always and foremost look out for the welfare of the Church.  He was taught not to approve any 
measure that would weaken the Church but also to recover all that had been lost.  Ferdinand 
should select Catholic officials, always have a Catholic confessor and remain close to the 
Jesuits.  All members of his household should be made to make an open confession of 
Catholicism.  His military should be Catholic.  The defense and advance of Catholicism, and 
allegiance to the Jesuits should always be his first priorities.193 
Ferdinand's five years at Ingolstadt purposely isolated him from Protestants.  King Philip 
IV of Spain, King Louis XIII of France, King Charles I of England, and King Gustav Adolf of 
Sweden never studied at a university or college.  They all were educated at court by tutors.194  
Ferdinand’s Ingolstadt years had a profound impression on him.  In his farewell address, he 
declared that he would always have in his heart the interests of the college and the Society of 
Jesus.195 
In 1598, Jesuit Count Girolama Portia accompanied Ferdinand on a journey to Italy.  The 
Count had previously served as Rector at the Jesuit College at Olmutz, led the Austrian Provence 
of the Jesuits as Provincial and was later Rector of the new university at Graz.  Until 1619, he 
was Ferdinand's confessor.196  The importance and the influence of a devout Jesuit with daily 
access to the future Holy Roman Emperor cannot be overstated.  On his Italian trip Ferdinand 
visited the Catholic sacred Shrine of Loreto.  There it is reported that Ferdinand vowed to God, 
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under the patronage of the Virgin Mary, to drive the Protestants out of Inner Austria and restore 
Catholicism.197 
In December 1596, Ferdinand was installed as ruler of Inner Austria.  He firmly resisted 
any discussion of religious matters until the Estates swore allegiance.  Implicitly, he rejected the 
Pacification of Bruck, but neither Ferdinand nor the Protestant Estates were yet ready for 
confrontation.  Part of the reason for the submission of the Estates may well have been the 
continuing Turkish threat.198   In the months following the investiture of Ferdinand, he took some 
repressive steps, which were met with strong resistance in the Styrian towns of Aussee, 
Mitterndorf and Radkersberg.  But strong Counter -Reformation measures did not increase until 
after Ferdinand returned from his Italian trip.199 
 At age 18, Ferdinand assumed governance of his hereditary domains in Inner Austria.  
Before swearing allegiance the Estates of Crniola, Carinthia, and Styria demanded a guarantee 
for religious freedom.  Ferdinand told them that religion had nothing to do with allegiance.  Their 
oaths were to be unconditional.  In receipt of the apostolic benediction of Clement VIII, 
Ferdinand set about the task of eliminating Protestantism from his realms.  Without arousing 
chaos, he suppressed the Protestants in town after town and, to the astonishment of many, 
Protestantism was gone.  Catholics revered him as a champion; Protestants began to 
acknowledge him as their most dangerous enemy.200  As a youth, Ferdinand had witnessed the 
struggle of his parents against the Protestant Styrian Estates.  After he assumed power, he 
rigorously enforced the Counter-Reformation.  His deputies enforced adherence to the Catholic 
Church.  Those subjects who refused to comply were exiled.201 
After several incidents of conflict between Catholics and Protestants, Ferdinand opted to 
move against the Protestants.  His first measures were to provide efficient government and to 
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then start removing Protestant preachers, the disturbers of the peace.  On September 13, 1598, he 
ordered the closure of the Protestant schools and churches in Graz, Judenber and all the other 
cities and towns of Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola, and ordered the preachers to leave within 14 
days.  He based his authority on his position as Archduke.202  Ferdinand's Counter-Reformation 
measures were relentless.  Perceived heresy was not tolerated.  Between 1598 and 1605 it is 
estimated 11,000 left the region.  Concurrently, Catholic evangelization of the population 
intensified.  On August 8, 1600, 10,000 Protestant books were publicly burned.203 
A meeting of the Estate Princes took place on January 10, 1599.  The Protestant Estates 
threatened to withhold homage to Ferdinand and to withhold taxes in support of the defense 
against the Turks.  Ferdinand informed them that they had no say in the matter and added that 
they would be considered rebels and enemies in any attempt to withhold taxes.  He followed with 
another decree expelling Protestant preachers.  Ferdinand restricted debate to military and 
political matters, particularly the Turks.  
Ferdinand then waited until after the Protestant Princes returned home.   In July he acted.  
He began by asserting that the Estates sinned when they used hot, immoderate, sharp or irritating 
words when addressing him.   Refusal to approve stipends, moreover, aided the Turks and other 
enemies.  He added that the Estates did not speak for all his subjects as they excluded prelates 
and most Catholics.  Most importantly, he claimed absolutum et merum imperium in his 
territory not imperium modificatum.  That is, his authority was absolute.   On February 24, 1600, 
in Graz, the Estates formally responded and capitulated.  They denied that their refusal to 
cooperate was aid for the Turks.  They acknowledged that Ferdinand was their natural and 
absolute Prince.  But they argued that when Ferdinand ascended as Archduke that he was bound 
to the Pacification of Bruck agreed to by his father.  Ferdinand ignored them.  By the end of July, 
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the last 150 non-Catholic men in Graz were expelled.  Ferdinand would continue to negotiate 
with the Estates, but he had demonstrated, beyond any doubt, that he was in control.204 
Ferdinand by direct lineage was removed from his Hapsburg predecessors.  Rudolph II 
and Matthias were sons of Emperor Maximilian II.  The much younger Ferdinand was the son of 
Carl II, Maximilian II’s youngest brother.   Ferdinand was a Jesuit educated, young, energetic, 
shrewd, zealous Catholic.  In the events leading to the upcoming war, he would become the 
Catholic Confession’s irresistible force.  He assiduously defended his offices of Emperor, and 
King of Bohemia.  Under his reign, the Protestant Reformation and the steady ascent of its 
adherents would be brought to a halt.  His collision with the immovable object, equally zealous 
Calvinist Frederic V would result in war.  
G.  Palatine Elector Frederick V and eventual King of Bohemia: 
The ascent of the Reformation and Calvinism was especially strong in the strategically 
important Palatine.  The Elector Palatine had control of territory comparable to France, Spain or 
England.  The Palatine courts were almost totally independent from the Emperor.  The Elector 
also had control of a 15,000 man army over which he was Commander-in-Chief; he controlled 
the churches.  By 1618, the University of Heidelberg was a haven for Calvinist theologians and 
had been for nearly a half-century.205   
The Calvinist emergence in the Palatine moved Protestant tactics toward confrontation.  
Its adoption of the Reformation in the 1540's distanced the Palatine from the Ecclesiastical 
Electors and other former allies in the Imperial Church.  In 1556 and 1557, The Palatine assumed 
the role of Protestant militancy first expressed at the Reichstag after the Augsburg settlement.  
They presented a series of escalating demands that continued up to 1618.  The Palatine Calvinists 
sought to circumvent the Catholic majority by splitting the Reichstag along confessional lines.  
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The confessions, they believed, should debate issues separately and then convene as equals to 
reach common agreement.  This became known as itio in partes.   The Palatine also insisted that 
Protestant grievances (Gravamina) be treated under the Protestant interpretation of the Augsburg 
Peace.  It was a policy proposal that reflected Cardinal Klesl’s position.  The implementation of 
the policy may have prevented war. 
To achieve these goals the Palatine consistently supported the withholding of funding the 
Turkish War and blocking the election of King of the Romans, the heir apparent to the Holy 
Roman Emperor.  Recall that the Augsburg Peace attempted to defuse tensions by taking 
doctrine out of politics but did nothing to integrate the political factions into the Reichstag or 
other Imperial institutions.206  
Calvinism also continued to gain strength elsewhere in the Empire.  In 1610, the 
Hohenzollern Elector of Brandenburg joined the Protestant Union and in 1613 converted to 
Calvinism.  In 1616, he married his son to Palatine Elector Frederick V's wife's sister, 
strengthening Frederick V's already strong political position.207 
Historian Brennan Purcell, among others, believes that Palatine Elector Frederick 
V personally was a principal cause of the outbreak of the Thirty Years War.  Frederick V’s 
character, values and beliefs shaped his political policy.  He was devoutly religious and a 
constitutionalist.208  Based on Frederick V's writings, some called him a mystic because he 
believed that it was possible to understand God and his will through insight, intuition, prayer or 
some other form of experience.  He was a zealous Calvinist.209  He was also driven by his belief 
that German Liberty was threatened by the ruling, Catholic, Hapsburg monarchy.210  Frederick 
was a potent foe of the Hapsburgs, and his refusal to come to terms with them stymied peace 
attempts.  Fredericks V's papers are replete with references to his belief that the Austrian and 
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Spanish Hapsburgs were conspiring to transform Bohemia and the Empire into Hapsburg 
heritable monarchies.  He also believed that they sought to extirpate Protestantism.211  
Frederick was also strongly driven by his sense of honor.  In early modern Germany, 
honor was a measure of personal, social and political worth.  Honor drove assertive, 
competitive and aggressive behavior in all ranks of society, but especially in the nobility.  An 
assault on one's honor was usually redressed with violence.  Perceived honor violations were 
legitimate causes of war, peace and revolution.  During the course of events running up to the 
war, and after its outbreak, Frederick's refusal to compromise his honor prevented him from 
renouncing alliances, breaking confidences, and reneging on promises.  This inflexibility 
rendered him nearly incapable of making peace on anyone's terms but his own.  Up to the 
outbreak of the War, Frederick V was the most powerful and prominent Calvinist Prince in the 
Empire.212 
Frederick V's strong beliefs lead some scholars to believe that he was reckless, inflexible 
and belligerent.  Frederick V's conscience told him that God was with him and that his personal 
honor was at stake in the resolution of constitutional issues.  His intransigent behavior would 
contribute significantly to the transformation of the Bohemian rebellion into a European civil 
war.   Frederick V also made every effort to embroil foreign powers in the conflict.  His 
obstructive positions, policies and relentless use of force would expand the conflict despite 
multi-confessional attempts to establish peace.  Despite repeated setbacks, Frederick V's faith 
and obsession with his honor enabled him to resist capitulation and prolong the conflict.  He was 
absolutely convinced that the Catholics were determined to corrupt the constitution.  All his 
decisions, he believed, were predicated on the preservation of the Imperial Constitution and the 
guarantee of religious freedoms for Protestants.213  In July 1614, when he reached legal age, the 
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Palatine Regents handed over control of the Palatinate to Frederick V.  His motto was: “Rule me, 
Lord, according to your word."214  His firm Calvinist beliefs convinced him of the righteousness 
of his cause and an unmistakable belief in victory. 
All of the Emperors were dependent upon the Electors for their power; they had to 
consult with the Electors on matters of war and peace, foreign policy, taxes, alliances.  The 
Electors were powerful, and Frederick was the most powerful among equals.  In 1618, Frederick 
was 22 years old, and arguably recklessly self-assured as only a 22 year-old can be.  As Elector 
Palatine, he had the highest ceremonial prestige in the Empire, second only to the Emperor 
himself.  The Palatine Elector was the only Prince who could sit in judgment of an emperor.  
According to the Golden Bull, an Emperor accused of a violation of law was required to answer 
to the Palatine Elector in the Imperial Diet.  Frederick was also one of the two Imperial Vicars 
who would share Imperial power during periods of Interregnum.  Despite his youth and 
inexperience, Frederick possessed enormous power.215 
In Prague, the rebelling Bohemian Protestant Estates remained terrified of Ferdinand II 
and declared the Bohemian Throne vacant.216  On August 19, 1619, the Directors of Bohemia 
met and decided that Ferdinand II would be deposed as King.  "On the 26, of August, they met 
againe (sic), and after prayers . . . Frederike (sic) Elector Palatine . . . was chosen and proclaimed 
King of Bohemia."217 
On August 23 or 24, Frederick V learned of the Bohemian Directors’ decision to oust 
Ferdinand II.  Almost immediately thereafter, the Bohemian Estates elected Frederick V King.  It 
was his 23rd birthday.  Frederick V received advice from his father-in-law James I of England, 
the Protestant Union and his own councilors.  They all discouraged him from accepting the 
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Bohemian’s invitation.  James I of England feared a dangerous monarchial precedent.218  If The 
Holy Roman Emperor could be unseated as King of Bavaria, so could the King of England. 
Despite all his shortcomings, Frederick V was a constitutional legalist, and he regarded 
Imperial Law as has his guiding principle in politics.  He sought legal opinions concerning the 
Bohemian's right to elect a King.  He inquired into Imperial abuses of Bohemian constitutional 
privileges.  He knew that accepting the Crown would bring on war.  He enquired about the 
strength of the Bohemian army, its officers, its supplies and the strategic terrain.  He fully 
understood the consequences of his accepting the Crown.219  
Frederick V’s appeal to James I was based on constitutional grounds.  Frederick V 
believed that the uprising was in defense of Bohemian rights, not a rebellion against the 
monarchy.  The hated, zealous Jesuits were the problem.  The Bohemians were just defending 
their lives, liberty, religious freedom and, most importantly, their honor.  Frederick V asked 
James I to take an active military defensive stance.  After all, the papists were intent on 
extirpating Protestantism.  But James I wanted no part of an English intervention in Europe.220 
Detractors pointed out that if he accepted the Crown, Ferdinand II would label him a 
criminal, and substantive help could not be expected from within or outside the Empire.  The 
most powerful reason not to accept the Crown was that it would embroil Europe in a religious 
war that neither side could win.  In the end, Frederick V accepted the Crown because he firmly 
believed that God had preordained it.  It would prove to be a foolish and catastrophic decision for 
Europe.221 
There is, however, documentary evidence that Frederick V wanted peace, but the peace 
had to be on his terms, favorable to the Protestant Estates and subject to the Letter of Majesty.  
Factoring into the now remote possibility for peace was Frederick’s total distrust of the 
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Hapsburgs.  He regarded their intentions as malicious, their promises worthless and behavior 
reprehensible.222   
On July 31, 1619, the Bohemian Confederation met.  It consisted of the directors, regents 
and councilors of the Confederation, and represented the three Estates of the Kingdom.  The 
following excerpt from the Bohemian’s declaration is illustrative of the passion of the 
Protestants.  The preamble of the meeting’s minutes states that its actions were directed to 
upholding its "freedoms" in the face of "evil people" intent on undermining them.  They 
proclaimed 100 “terms" which, in total, were tantamount to a declaration of independence and 
the establishment of an independent government.   The publication was, is essence, an ultimatum 
which was sure to be rejected by the Emperor.  The first ten summarized terms reflect the tone 
and scope of the document: 
1.  God has given his grace and blessing to the Confederation solely in defense of 
 religion. 
2.  The Confederation will include the King provided he pays attention to the 
 privileges, Letters of Majesty, concessions and terms of the Confederation. 
3.  The King should not take advice from Jesuits or foreigners. 
4.  The Jesuits are banned from the Kingdom. 
5.  There will be no new religious orders in the Kingdom. 
6.  Abandoned Church properties are property of the Estates. 
7.  The King must conform without any exception or restriction to both the Letters 
 of Majesty and religious concessions. 
8.  All churches in Protestant hands will remain so in perpetuity. 
9.  Moravia, Upper and Lower Lusatia which do not have a Letter of Majesty will 
 be treated as a party to it. 
10. Terms of the Augsburg and Bohemian Confessions are extended to every man 
 and women in all the territories, as is (sic) the construction of churches, schools 
 and other institutions and the appointment of pastors and teachers.223 
 
Frederick V’s concurrence with the Bohemian Confederation and the depth of his 
vehemence toward the Hapsburgs are reflected in his “Open Letter from Frederick V Regarding 
His Acceptance of the Bohemian Crown, November 7, 1619”: 
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We, Frederick, by the grace of God king of Bohemia, count Palatine and 
elector. [etc.] . . . declare:  That we have no doubt that everone (sic) without and 
beyond (sic) the Empire is sufficiently aware of the wretched and angerous (sic) 
state into the ancient and worthy kingdom of Bohmia (sic) . . . has fallen . . . and 
what suffering, tribulation and hostilities have been occurring for some time with 
unceasing robbery, murder, arson and ruination of the territory . . . hacking of 
suckling babes and the like inhuman, barbarous excesses, maliciousness and 
atrocities.224 
 
The Bohemians’ offer of the Crown to Frederick V appeared attractive because they 
believed that it likely assured them of international Protestant support.  But religious zeal 
inclined the Bohemian and Palatine leadership to underestimate the risks that they were taking.  
Acceptance of the Crown by Frederick V and deposing Ferdinand II challenged the core of the 
Hapsburgs’ domestic power and international standing.  Armed conflict in Bohemia became 
inevitable, but it was assumed that the coming conflict would be regionally contained.225 
The reaction in Europe's Courts was horror and condemnation.  James I said he "was 
most afflicted . . . and this war had become a war of religion."226  Pope Paul V said that Frederick 
had entered “a filthy labyrinth" in which he would meet his ruin.  The other Electors begged him 
to reconsider.  Others proposed that he defuse the situation and become "Protector" but refuse the 
Crown.227 
Like James I, the Protestant Union decided to recognize and observe the Protestant 
Rebellion as a cause of concern.  But they resolved not to fight.  Consequently, Bohemia had 
little tangible military support.228  In the end, the Protestant Union provided neither troops nor 
financial assistance.  They only agreed to defend the Palatine in the event of invasion.  This was 
of no help whatsoever to the Bohemian cause.229 
The most powerful Princes of the Empire implored Frederick V to abdicate.  In March 
1620, a meeting of the Electors of Mainz, Cologne, Trier and Saxony, joined by Maximilian and 
the Landgrave of Hessen, condemned the Bohemian election and resolved to support the new 
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Emperor.  Emperor Ferdinand II then publically threatened Frederick.   If Frederick V did not 
relinquish the Crown by June 1, 1620, he would be declared an outlaw and be subject to the 
Imperial Ban.  Recall that a Ban deprived the accused of any legal protections, vacated titles and 
property and forbade assistance of any kind within the Empire.  Ferdinand II also issued an edict 
to nullify the Bohemian election of Frederick V.  Frederick V ignored both.230 
These challenges notwithstanding, Frederick V's new regime had a chance for survival.  
Ever since The Augsburg Peace in 1555, the Emperors consistently had yielded to pressure.  
Recent events in Bohemia, moreover, had always resulted in concessions from the Hapsburgs.  
Also, from a military perspective, it is easier to defend then attack.231  The regime’s downfall 
was the result of two weaknesses: its inability to force the Estates to make financial contributions 
and ineffective diplomacy.  There was no unified Protestant resolve to assure that the regime 
survived.  To the contrary, the Protestants were persuaded not to support Frederick and the 
Bohemians had to face the force of the Empire alone.  Ferdinand II, on the other hand, had the 
support of Spain, and more importantly, the support of Maximilian of Bavaria and his military 
muscle.232 
Brennan Purcell argues that Frederick V's Calvinism had little to do with his acceptance 
of the Bohemian Crown.  Frederick V’s motives were legally and militarily predictable.  He 
calculated the risks and rewards and took the chance.  It was a big mistake.  Ferdinand II was 
now Emperor and the deposed King of Bohemia.  There was no alternative for the two 
juxtaposed Princes.  It would be war.233 
In addition to the direct challenge to Ferdinand II’s Imperial authority, there was a more 
subtle, but real motivation for the Hapsburgs to crush the Bohemian Rebellion.  In theory, the 
seven Electors were advisors to the Emperor whom they alone elected.  In fact, they were agents 
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standing against the consolidation of Imperial power.  Recall that the three ecclesiastical 
Electors, the archbishops of Mainz, Cologne and Trier were Catholic.  Three of the Estate 
Electors, Saxony, Brandenburg and Palatinate were Protestant.  The seventh Elector was the 
King of Bohemia.  Frederick's agreement to accept the Bohemian Crown, at the expense of 
Ferdinand, would upset the balance of Electoral power in favor of the Protestants.234  The specter 
of Frederick V as Elector King of Bohemia, and Elector Palatine, made a Protestant Emperor a 
real possibility.235  Frederick V, with the other Protestant Electors, would have the majority 
necessary to elect Ferdinand II's successor.   
Ferdinand II promised Catholic Maximilian the supreme command of the Empire's army, 
to be raised by Maximilian, and control of Upper Austria if Maximilian successfully crushed the 
rebellion.   Most importantly, Maximilian could keep any Palatine land he conquered and would 
assume the position of Elector Palatine.  The battle lines were drawn.  Both Maximilian and 
Frederick II were willing to risk a general war.  In vain, Frederick V appealed to Maximilian to 
remain neutral.  Maximilian responded that a decision to keep the Bohemian Crown would mean 
war.236  Frederick V’s zealously inspired obstinacy rendered him the metaphorical “immovable 
object” in the face of Ferdinand II as the “irresistible force.”  Frederick V too was a cause of The 
Thirty Years War. 
On November 8, 1620, Maximilian’s Imperial Army, under the command of Johann 
Tserclaes von Tilly, crushed the Bohemians at White Mountain, outside of Prague.  Frederick V 
literally ran for his life leaving behind the crown, scepter, royal orb of Bohemia and his jewel-
encrusted Order of the Garter.  Worse, he left behind documents including correspondence 
between Bohemia and enemies of the Hapsburgs.  Ferdinand II and Maximilian regarded the 
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victory as proof of God's grace and will.237  For his role in the Thirty Years War, Frederick V 
was afforded the disdainful title: "Winter King."238 
After the victory at White Mountain, Ferdinand II's lieutenants established programs of 
persecution and reorganization.  All the active participants in the rebellion were liquidated.  
Calvinists and Lutheran ministers were expelled.  Protestant towns were closely supervised.  
Ferdinand II was consistently, religiously passionate in crushing the Bohemian Protestants.   He 
steadfastly believed that heresy was the root cause of insubordination and his resolve was to 
eradicate it.239 
Ferdinand II could have stopped the spread of conflict with the subjugation of Bohemia.   
Subsequently, however, Imperial troops drove the Protestants out of the Upper and Lower 
Palatine.  Frederick V was banned from the Empire by Ferdinand II and driven into exile in the 
Dutch Netherlands.  Maximilian was vested as Elector in Frederick's place.240  The Thirty Years 
War, in its later variations, would continue for 28 more years. 
CONCLUSION:   
In 1519, Charles V became Holy Roman Emperor.  Invention, discovery, and political 
change characterized much of Europe at this time.  Mariners used the compass to enable global 
nautical exploration.  The use of gun powder revolutionized war by providing less powerful 
opponents with an equalizer, and printing provided a medium to dispense knowledge.  National 
identities, local languages, culture, laws and institutions evolved.241  It was a period of industrial 
and commercial development and the evolution of towns.  Patriotism, use of the vernacular, 
scientific knowledge, and national churches developed and along with it growing opposition to 
the established centralized system of church and imperial governance.242  This period marked the 
rise and consolidation of nation-states over the power of feudalism.243  
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The social, political and economic landscape was undergoing profound change.  
Arguably, had there been no change in the Catholic Church’s monopoly on religion, the 
European movement toward modernity was inevitable and could have occurred without 
bloodshed.  The centralized authority of the Catholic Church, however, was weakening and 
decadent.  The prelates had lost contact with their clergy and people.244  The Popes, as temporal 
rulers, became immersed in politics and power and abdicated their Episcopal authority.245  The 
centralized power of church and state in many ways overlapped.  The system was stretched thin 
and decay was apparent.246 
On October 31, 1517, Martin Luther posted his Ninety-Five Theses on a German church 
door.  The recently invented printing press and increasing mass literacy insured that the Theses 
received rapid and extensive distribution.  Europe was ripe for confessional change.  In just 38 
years, Lutheranism would become the second legally recognized religion in the Empire.  In the 
second half of the 16th Century, the works of John Calvin, to become known as Calvinism would 
become the Empire’s third strongly rooted religion.  Historians disagree whether the 
Reformation and the Catholic Counter-Reformation were causes of the Thirty Years War.  There 
is no disagreement that confessional differences were a powerful catalyst facilitating conflict. 
The causes of the War are myriad and debatable.  But there is no debate that the Thirty 
Years War began with the Bohemian Revolt in 1618.  This paper posits that the principal causes 
for the War were: 1) The Treaty of Augsburg; 2) the constant threat posed by the Ottoman Turks 
in the east and the Empire’s inadequate political structures to effectively deal with it; 3) the 
Hapsburg’s deliberately self-imposed weakening of Imperial authority and prestige; 4) the 
Brothers’ Quarrel; 5) the damaging, inconsistent and arbitrary application of Imperial policy and 
power; 6) the cumulative effect of 63 years of ever increasing political and confessionally 
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charged tensions and conflicts that culminated in two warring camps – one led by Catholic 
Ferdinand II and the other led by Frederick V; and 7) the Bohemian Revolt itself. 
In 1555, Charles V abdicated and split the Empire.  His brother Ferdinand I ruled as Holy 
Roman Emperor in Vienna.  His son, Philip II ruled as King of Spain, the Netherlands, parts of 
Italy and the New World.  The geographic split also halved the power and prestige of the 
Emperor.  The Empire’s constitutional structure also contributed to the erosion of Imperial 
authority.  The execution of Ferdinand I’s will further diluted the Emperor’s authority by 
granting separate authorities to his sons. 
The Hapsburgs then sold concessions and privileges to the Princes to liquidate Imperial 
debt.  For decades, the Imperial House resorted to political and economic concessions to mollify 
the increasingly powerful Protestant Estates.  The power, prestige and influence of the Estates 
increased, and the power, prestige and influence of the Emperor weakened.  This power shift 
contributed to the eventual outbreak of war. 
In 1576, Rudolf II succeeded Frederick I’s son Maximilian II as Emperor.  Rudolf II was 
philosophically motivated and surrounded himself with an eclectic array of like minded people.  
He did not like the details of governing, was increasingly reclusive and alleged to suffer from 
mental illness.  Rudolf II’s disposition prompted his brother Matthias’s bid, with the support of 
the Hapsburg family, to supplant him.  This clash became known as the Brothers’ Quarrel.  The 
Brothers vied for political position by buying influence with the Protestant Princes with ever 
escalating political and confessional concessions.  The result was the quasi independence of 
several Imperial Eastern dominions.  The Quarrel was resolved with the ousting and subsequent 
death of Rudolf II and the coronation of Emperor Matthias.  But the damage had been done.  The 
Imperial House was further weakened and the Empire was further down the road to civil war. 
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Concurrent with the Brothers’ Quarrel, there were two significant crises in Germany that 
threatened war.  The Jülich-Cleves crises stemmed from a succession issue.  The Donauwörth 
crisis resulted from a Catholic and Protestant conflict over the public exercise of religion.  The 
Empire arbitrarily and capriciously intervened in both, to the benefit of the Hapsburgs and their 
Catholic allies.  War was eventually averted, but the Protestant Estates were further outraged and 
needlessly disaffected.  The increasingly heated political environment was a facilitating step 
toward hostilities. 
In the early 17th Century, two powerful Princes came of age.  Ferdinand II brought a 
renewed perspective to Imperial rule.  He was Jesuit educated and influenced, and a shrewd, 
devout, staunch Catholic.  He was intent on restoring the power and prestige of the Imperial 
House and the primacy of the Catholic Church.  Frederick V was the young, devout, doctrinaire 
Calvinist Elector Palatine.  Frederick V’s power and authority ware only second to those of the 
Emperor.  War became inevitable when Frederick V usurped the Bohemian Crown of Ferdinand 
II.  The Thirty Years War started because of Frederick V’s and Ferdinand II’s actions. 
The final cause of the Thirty Years War was the Bohemian Revolt itself.  It represented 
the climactic result of all the War’s precedent causes.  The Bohemian Protestant Princes were 
justified in their belief that they would prevail.  After all, they enjoyed an overwhelming 
confessional majority.  The Hapsburgs, moreover, had always resolved conflict with 
concessions.  If conflict came, Bohemia had the military capacity to defend itself.  Certainly, the 
rising tides of Protestantism and decentralized authority would continue to prevail.  Clearly, the 
powerful Protestant Estates and Protestant Crowned Heads of Europe would support them.  They 
were wrong, dead wrong.  Emperor Ferdinand II crushed them.   
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The Bohemian War was over.  Ferdinand II could have proclaimed victory and dissolved 
the Imperial Army.  Instead the soon to be Thirty Years War was extended into the Palatine and 
other parts of the Empire.  In 1648, the successive wars that constituted the War would end with 
the Treaty of Westphalia.  Feudalism in Europe would end, and the era of nation-states and early 
modernity would begin.  The steep price for this transition was the Thirty Years War, Europe’s 
tragedy.   
 
“On my honor, I have not given, nor received, nor witnessed any unauthorized assistance 
on this work.” 
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